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 I 
ABSTRACT 
Clean water is crucial for survival and economic development.  Everyday, people need 
a sufficient amount and a suitable quality of water for drinking, cleaning and sanitation.  
However, rapid population growth, pollution and climate change have made water a 
scarce resource, which everyone competed.  The United Nations Development 
Program’s recent report stated that more than 1 billion people, up to this day, are 
without access to safe drinking water and sanitation.  Lack of access to clean water 
can cause social, economic and health problems.  Therefore, there is an urgent need 
to find solutions to this problem. 
To solve the problem of water scarcity, International Financial Institutions introduced 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the management of water sector.  PPP is a concept 
which involves private sector participation in the management of drinking water service.  
In PPP, water is recognized as an economic good which is recognised under the 1992 
Dublin Principles.  It was hoped that by placing an economic value on water, efficient 
and equitable use of water can be achieved. It was also hoped that it would encourage 
conservation and protection of water resources.  However, studies show opposite 
results from the Principle.  Jakarta drinking water service is one example of a failed 
PPP. 
Jakarta, the Capital City of Indonesia, adopted Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the 
management of its drinking water service in 1998.  The twenty five years concession 
contract was granted to Thames Water International (TWI) and its local partner, 
Kekarpola Airindo (KATI), now known as Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ).   This company is 
responsible for the management of Eastern Jakarta drinking water service.   
This research was aimed to evaluate Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) performance on water 
provision in Eastern Jakarta, ten years into the twenty five years concession by 
undergoing a qualitative research method.  A range of semi-structured interviews were 
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used to: gain perceptions and opinions of each stakeholder on the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP), identify the advantages and/or disadvantages of the water 
privatization in the capital city and to identify the constraints and limitations facing the 
private sector.  Participants involved in this research include Government officials, 
Thames PAM Jaya, Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB), non 
governmental organizations (NGOs), and TPJ customers. 
The analysis concludes that Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Eastern Jakarta does 
not bring improvement to the region’s drinking water service.  Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) 
had failed in fulfilling targets set in the Cooperation Agreement.  Lack of transparency 
and public tendering in the process of forming the public private partnership may have 
contributed to this poor performance because the proper search for a competent 
partner was short circuited.  Political interference in the bidding process is a form of 
corruption in which the company granted the contract was clearly complicit.   
The water tariff in Jakarta is not only the highest in Indonesia, but it is also the highest 
in the Southeast Asia region.  The quality of its service, however, is still of poor quality.  
Limited access to water due to its high price and low service has resulted in water 
hacking and the on-going use of groundwater.  The Cooperation Agreement, on the 
other hand, has locked the Government of Indonesia into a long term partnership which 
is very disadvantageous for the government and the residents. 
Private sector involvement should be the last alternative to improve the management of 
the water supply service in Indonesia.   
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Chapter One – Introduction, Aim and Objectives 
1.1 Introduction 
Sufficient clean water is essential to everyone’s wellbeing.  Yet nearly 20 percent of the 
world’s population or up to 1 billion people do not have access to safe and affordable 
drinking water (Budds and McGranahan, 2003).  Access to water is a basic need and a 
nation’s socioeconomic development can be measured by its ability to provide water.  
Lack of access to a safe supply of water reduces the productivity of people and it is a 
clear indication of whether they are in a poverty trap.  Waterborne diseases impact 
disadvantageously on the ability of a household to generate income.   The long hours 
waiting in line for water which is mainly done by women and children is time 
consuming, reduces opportunities for education and other activities that might generate 
better household incomes.   
The problems of water supply were given high priority by the 2000 UN General 
Assembly, when it declared The Millenium Development Goals (MDGs).  The objective 
of target 10 is to halve the number of people without access to clean water by 2015.  
Indonesia is one of the countries that committed itself to the MDGs and participated in 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg.  
Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, with an estimated population approaching 10 
million people (Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 2005) and growing at 1.4 percent annually 
(2005 Statistics, World Bank, 2007), faces a huge challenge in overcoming short falls in 
water supply.   
According to figures provided by the WHO, each person requires approximately 50 
litres to 60 litres a day to remain healthy (Goldman, 2007).  This means, the city 
requires approximately 600 million litres per day to keep basic utilities such as drinking, 
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cooking and sanitation operating.  The problem in Jakarta water supply is that although 
the two water companies, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ)1 and PAM Lyonnaise Jaya 
(PALYJA), are capable of producing the amount of water required, high percentage of 
water loss which reaches up to 50 percent along the distribution system reduces the 
ability of both companies to provide all of its customers with sufficient quantity and 
quality of drinking water (JWSRB, 2007). 
On top of this there is a need for a much greater volume of water required to support 
economic growth and the activities associated with industry, agriculture and various 
kinds of businesses such as hotels, offices, shopping malls and recreation centres.  
Although these problems will not be the focus of this research they indicate how current 
demand is growing faster than the ability of the city administration to provide enough 
water.   
The capital city’s water supply comes from various sources which are unevenly 
distributed and of poor quality.  These sources include a piped water network 
connected to the Capital City’s drinking water service, groundwater, surface water (e.g. 
rivers), collected rain water, and water vendors (Shofiani, 2003).  Less than 60 percent 
of the city’s residents are connected to the network, which to this day still delivers non-
potable water and owing to the presence of faecal coliform, residents are advised to 
boil their water.  High percentage of water loss has continued to present a major 
financial problem to the Capital City’s Drinking Water Service. 
Those who neither formally nor informally access water from the Capital City’s drinking 
water service rely on groundwater and a small percentage relies on other sources such 
as water vendors and commercialised bottled water which has been judged to be of 
poor quality and expensive (Bakker, 2006).  Due to poor sanitation facilities, untreated 
                                                 
 
1
 Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has changed its name to Aetra since April 2008 after it sold its entire share to 
Acuatico and Alberta, the new shareholder.  However, the name Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) will continue to 
be used throughout this report. 
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industrial waste and overexploitation of the city’s groundwater and surface water, the 
quality of the water supplied continues to fall.  There are few supply alternatives like 
water sold by vendors.  However, it is too expensive and certainly unreasonably priced 
for the poor. 
To solve the Capital City’s water supply problems the Indonesian government has 
agreed to adopt a twinned strategy backed by the World Bank.  This involves placing 
water supply in the hands of the private sector and initiating appropriate water law 
reform.   It is hoped that through efficiency gains, improved management and better 
access to finance, the private sector can improve access to water by extending 
networks and providing new connections to previously un-serviced customers (Bakker, 
2006).  Thus, with the hope for better service that will benefit everybody including the 
poor, Government of Indonesia in 1998 invited Thames Water International (British) 
and Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (French), two of the biggest private water companies in 
the world, to be involved in the operation and maintenance of Jakarta drinking water 
service as partners in Public Private Partnership (PPP)2.  Each private sector was 
awarded with twenty five years concession.    
A few years after the establishment of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta 
drinking water service, however, only little improvement was evident in the Capital 
City’s water service performance.  The majority of residents were not satisfied with the 
service and displeased with the continuing price increases set by the private sectors.  
Despite all the complaints made by residents, Government of Indonesia still sees 
private sectors involvement in water service as beneficial.  In 2004, the new Water Law 
Number 7 was introduced by the Government of Indonesia to provide a framework for 
                                                 
 
2
 The term public-private partnership (PPP), not privatization, will continue to be used throughout the report 
to describe private sector involvement in Jakarta Water Supply Service.  This is to emphasize that Jakarta 
Water Supply Service is using a concession based model which is not completely privatized as the word 
‘privatisation’ can be viewed differently. 
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water sector management at the national level which also provide framework for private 
sector involvement in water utility.  The public and Non Government Organisations 
(NGOs) claimed that the new Water Law is more of corporate centred than people 
centred.  Public Private Partnership (PPP) in water supply continues to be a 
controversial issue both in Indonesia and globally. 
This research was attempted to clarify what is happening to the Jakarta water service 
by interviewing different stakeholders to obtain their views on how the reformed system 
was working.  This research was also undertaken to establish the reasons why the 
Indonesian government felt the need to give in to the pressure to privatise its water 
supply and determine the factors that led them to take this path rather than explore 
other alternatives.  In conclusion this research also tried to answer the question “Was 
privatisation of the Jakarta water supply economically justified and socially 
advantageous for the city’s residents?  If not, then why the Government of Indonesia 
continued the contract agreement with the private sector?”   
1.2 Principal Research Question 
After ten years of private sector involvement in Jakarta drinking water service, has the 
private sector succeeded in providing enough drinking water of sufficient quality that is 
economically justified and socially advantageous to Capital City residents? 
1.3 Aim 
The aim to this research is to evaluate the impact of public private partnership in 
Jakarta’s drinking water service and its impact on the City’s residents, ten years into 
the twenty five years contract. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The specific objectives proposed were to: 
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1. describe and evaluate private sector participation in managing the provision of 
drinking water to Jakarta in a way that provided an informed response to the 
questions above;  
2. identify and determine the advantages and/or disadvantages of the private sector 
involvement in the Capital City water provision; 
3. establish customers satisfaction on the quality of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) service 
i.e. water quality, quantity and continuity, and the cost of water; 
4. establish the customer income, the size of their families and use this information to 
find out what they could afford and get a measure of their willingness to pay; 
5. identify the constraints and limitations facing Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) in providing 
water to the residents of Jakarta.  
1.5 Research Outline 
This report of the research is divided into six chapters.  Chapter One describes what 
the research is about and outlines the aim and objectives of the research.  Chapter 
Two outlines the methods used and briefly introduces the range of institutions and 
organisations involved and the scope of the research.  Chapter Three reviews the 
literature, articles in journals and previous dissertations which address the topic and 
provides background information on DKI Jakarta and its water service, privatisation 
theory, and water privatisation in particular.  Chapter Four summarises Jakarta Water 
Supply Service performance, which are then discussed and analysed in Chapter Five.  
Finally, this research is concluded in Chapter Six.   
1.6 Research Limitations 
Time has been the major constraint in this research.  My lack of familiarity with the 
institutions involved and lack of relevant contacts and informants slowed the process of 
gathering information and put pressure on me to complete the work within the set time 
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limit.  The research involved sensitive issues and to establish trust with stakeholders 
was a major constraint.  Even though my status as an independent researcher is 
understood by the institutions involved in this research, some were reluctant to share 
their views.  It was difficult to get people’s genuine thoughts.    
Although Jakarta is my home town, when I started the research I had been living 
overseas for sometime and it took time for me to readjust to life in this complex 
metropolitan giant.   Jakarta is a city where people from different provinces and 
different cultural backgrounds congregate.  They arrive with a diverse range of 
expectations and the political, social and economic environment has a significant 
impact on individual attitudes, identities, personalities and the communities within the 
city which they live.  This needs to be taken into account when conducting research 
and it does not make the task any easier. 
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Chapter Two – Researcher Background and Methodology 
2.1 Researcher’s Background  
As I explained to those when I asked to participate in this research, I am a 
postgraduate student doing a Masters degree in Development Studies at Victoria 
University of Wellington.  I have a background in Environmental Engineering, where the 
technological aspect of drinking water provision was part of my studies.  The reason I 
choose this topic was to broaden my knowledge on the development of drinking water 
service to include its economic, social and political aspects.  As a fluent speaker of 
Bahasa Indonesia, I had the advantage of being able to access relevant literature and 
local reports and conduct fieldwork with different stakeholders.    
Water supply is a basic public service, traditionally provided by local government and 
maintained with revenue drawn from rate payers.  However, due to the failure of local 
government to either collect the company revenue necessary to maintain the service or 
competently manage and extend the service as Jakarta grew in which demand has far 
outstripped supply, making up the shortfall has proved to be difficult.  Developing the 
service means borrowing money.   Since the economy crisis of the 1997 to 1998, 
international funding led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been 
particularly reluctant to give loans unless they follow neo-liberal guidelines which 
promote private ownership.  The underlying rationales argues that the disconnection 
between agencies with responsibility for providing the service and those who use it 
needs to be restored by introducing a ‘user pays’ arrangement.  
Everybody is aware of the increasing demand for drinking water and the problem of 
short supply.  Private sector participation has become a solution forced on developing 
countries rather than accepted as a popular choice.  Private sector participation 
involves a second party outside the government, an agency that needs to make a 
profit.  The downside to this arrangement is the reduction of government responsibility 
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to provide a public service and the likelihood of rising charges and therefore, making it 
increasingly difficult for people to pay for and get water.  In Indonesia private sectors’ 
involvement in the management of drinking water remains a public-private partnership, 
but is the service equally available to all? 
Jakarta water supply was once managed by the city’s public water sector company, 
PAM Jaya.  However, due to its inability to provide drinking water for the rapidly 
increasing population, Government of Indonesia decided to invite two private 
companies as partners in a Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the management of 
Capital City’s drinking water.  The two private companies invited were directly awarded 
the contract by Government of Indonesia without having to go through public tendering 
process.  They were Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (French) and Thames Water 
International (British), which in 1998 were granted a twenty five years concession 
contract with PAM Jaya (Bakker, 2006).   
Several stakeholder groups were involved in the process of appointing the companies 
that were to participate in the Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta drinking 
water supply system, according to PAM Jaya (1998), they were as follows: 
• The government which included the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), 
Investment and Construction Development Agency (BAPEKIN), and the Regional 
Government of Jakarta; 
• The Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Jakarta); 
• The Regional Water Authorities which include PAM Jaya and the Regulatory Body; 
• The International Donor Agency which include the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank; 
• The two private companies, namely Thames Water International (TWI) and 
Lyonnaise des Eaux; 
  
9 
• Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which included the Indonesian 
Consumers Organisation (YLKI), Friends of the Earth (WALHI), Indonesia Drinking 
Water Communication Forum (FORKAMI), and International NGO Forum on 
Indonesian Development (INFID); 
• Indonesia Water Supply Association (PERPAMSI); 
• And consumers. 
From the discussions I had with some of the stakeholders above (listed in section 2.4), 
all agreed that the Government decision to establish Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
in Jakarta drinking water service was rushed, unprepared and high risk.  Indonesia, at 
the time when the decision took place, did not have a regulatory framework that 
regulates private sector involvement in public utilities, especially water which utility is 
human right.  The decision was conflicting with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia3.  It was especially difficult for PAM Jaya to finally agree to the partnership.  
Despite all of these debates which arose among stakeholders, PPP continued to take 
place and the Cooperation Agreement established. 
According to the Cooperation Agreement for Eastern Jakarta, the general purposes of 
the Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement were to upgrade PAM Jaya 
production, distribution, management and technological capabilities.  Thames Water 
International (TWI) has the expertise and financial and other sources relevant to the 
design, construction, management (including meter reading, billing and collection) and 
operation of facilities for the production and distribution of clean water and potable 
water.  This is why Government of Indonesia decided to invite TWI to be involved in the 
operation and management of Jakarta drinking water service in the shape of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP). 
                                                 
 
3
 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945 and its Amendments stated in Article 28 
regarding the ‘right to water’ and Article 33 regarding ‘right to exploit water’. 
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The establishment of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta drinking water service 
is expected to benefit all parties involved in which include to support economic and 
social development through water infrastructure development; achieve comprehensive 
coverage of piped water supply, extension of the distribution network, removal of the 
water supply backlog, change the use of ground water supply to piped water; upgrade 
supply and management; increase efficiency; ensure quantity, quality and continuity of 
the water supply; meet technical targets and service standards; upgrade customer 
services; reduce the quantity of unaccounted for water; improve operational 
performance, managerial capability and personnel performance; increase coverage 
ratio; and make the project self financing and economically viable.   
After ten years of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) involvement in Jakarta drinking water 
service, has it met these targets?  Above all I sought an answer to the following 
questions:  Does the company provide a better service than PAM Jaya?  Are residents 
of Eastern Jakarta satisfied with the service?   
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Preliminary Data/Information 
Preliminary data/information in this research was used as a background to the field 
study.  It was gathered through VUW search databases on academic journals, related 
websites, books, reports, and domestic inter-loan requests.  These are listed in 
References.  Most of in country and local data/information used came from publications 
written in Bahasa Indonesia, while the general debate and comparative material was 
available in English. 
2.2.2 Field Data/Information and Ethical consideration 
Field data/information was gathered by conducting semi-structured interviews with 
different stakeholders in Bahasa Indonesia.  Most of the interviews were recorded with 
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the consent from the interviewee and were later summarised before being analysed.  
All material collected was kept confidential.  Audio tapes and summaries from 
interviews were kept confidential and safely locked in a cabinet and on a computer with 
password access.  All material will be destroyed one year after the thesis is completed.  
This procedure follows the guidelines laid down by the Victoria University of Wellington 
Human Ethics Policy.  All participants could choose whether to have their comments 
attributed to them personally or to have their identity remain confidential.   
Human subjects are central to this research because it used interviews to get the views 
of different stakeholders on the Jakarta drinking water service, Thames PAM Jaya 
(TPJ).  Thus, ethical considerations were very important.  To avoid any possible harm 
that could arise from my research, I carefully followed the guidelines and got approval 
from the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington before I 
commenced fieldwork.  
2.2.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used in the field.  The interviews were guided by a list 
of questions, but neither the exact wording nor the order in which the questions were 
asked was determined ahead of time.  The interviews started with very broad open-
ended questions and let the responses of the interviewees guide the flow of the 
conversation (The list of interview questions is attached in the Appendix D).   
To get the view of consumers on water privatisation in Jakarta, a set of required 
questions was asked of consumers (Section 1 and section 2 of Appendix D) and 
followed by a very broad open ended question.  To strengthen the results of the 
interview and have the advantage of being able to compare, these questions were 
adapted from a Master Thesis, written by Shofiani (2003). 
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2.3 Location 
As shown in figure 2.1, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta (DKI Jakarta), the Special 
Capital Province of Jakarta, is subdivided into five municipalities, including North 
Jakarta, Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta and South Jakarta.  This research 
focuses on the eastern part of Jakarta, which is the service area of Thames PAM Jaya 
(TPJ), a privately owned water enterprise.  This area was chosen because of its dense 
population and the majority of the city’s poor live in the area, especially in the central 
and northern part of the company service area.  Thames PAM Jaya’s service area 
consisted of zone 2, zone 3 and zone 6 as shown in Figure 2.1.  The total number of 
customers in these areas, according to PAM Jaya (2007) is 376,139 people.  Thames 
PAM Jaya’s total production capacity is 9,000 liter per second. 
Figure 2.1  Map of Jakarta and PT. Thames PAM Jaya Service Area 
 
Source: Thames PAM Jaya. (12 June 2007). Pertemuan FKPM di Hotel Grand Mahakam. 
Jakarta. 
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2.4 List of Participants 
Two different groups of people were interviewed: 
1. Representatives from the wide range of institutions, including 
A.  Government 
• Department of Public Works of the Republic of Indonesia, Directorate of 
Drinking Water Development – responsible for the local governments’ 
capacity building in the provision of urban and regional infrastructures, 
including urban settlements and its infrastructures in the framework of 
regional autonomy.  The Department was involved in the process of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP), but did not play a major role. 
• National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Sub-directorate of 
Drinking Water – responsible for the establishment of development plans 
and policies at the national level.  BAPPENAS is in charge in preparing 
medium and long term national development programs for all sectors and of 
coordinating the ministries and evaluating the effectiveness of programs.  
Like the Department of Public Works, BAPPENAS was also involved in the 
process of Public Private Partnership (PPP).   
In 1997, BAPPENAS initiated a series of discussions, which resulted in a 
new vision of water resource management that involve equal allocation of 
water supply utility, implementation of an integrated approach in the 
management of water resources, and introduction to the concept of water as 
an economic good (Shofiani, 2003).    
B.  Regional Water Authority 
• PAM Jaya – a State owned Jakarta water enterprise, responsible for 
monitoring and evaluating private sectors performance in drinking water 
provision for the Capital City. 
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C.  Regulatory Body 
• BRPAM (Jakarta Water Sector Regulatory Body, JWSRB) – an independent 
and professional body, established in 2001 to mediate, facilitate and 
regulate the Jakarta Water Service Concession.  The body is responsible to 
ensure a balanced interest between the water consumers and water 
operator with respect to the implementation of the concessionaire 
agreement for the provision of drinking water in the DKI Jakarta Province.  
The private sector is basically interested in the generation of profit while the 
public sector more considers service delivery at affordable prices.   
D.  Local NGOs 
• Indonesia Drinking Water Quality Communication Forum (FORKAMI) – a 
local non governmental organisation (NGO), whose members consist of 
independent, non-bureaucratic professionals and experts working in the 
field of drinking water quality, who intended to provide a dialog mechanism 
among all stakeholders to guarantee efficient and effective cooperation to 
achieve the goal of a safe and healthy drinking water supply service for the 
community. 
• Friends of the Earth Indonesia (WALHI) – a local Non Governmental 
Organisation (NGO), involved in the water privatisation campaign.     
• People’s Coalition for the Right to Water (KruHA) – a local Non 
Governmental Organisation (NGO), established in 2002, with a mission to 
fight for a people based water resource management system run by users 
and government in a manner consistent with the national constitution and 
excluding private and individual business from participation in water 
resource management. 
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E.  International Financial Organisation 
• The World Bank – one of the two major financial agencies, besides Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), involved in the provision of loans in water 
resources management in Indonesia.  The World Bank was involved in the 
early process of PAM Jaya’s Public Private Partnership (PPP).  The bank, 
however, decided to step back from its involvement due to the direct 
appointment of the two private companies, Thames Water and Lyonnaisse 
des eaux.  Still, the Bank continued to provide assistance for the province of 
Jakarta to carry a study on the establishment of a regulatory body.  The 
bank also provided the Water Resource Structural Adjustment Loan 
(WATSAL) to carry out a policy reform in water sector.  One of the outputs 
of WATSAL is the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2004 
concerning Water Resources which is the framework of water resource 
management in Indonesia. 
F.  Private Water Enterprise 
• Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) – a privately owned water enterprise operates in 
the Eastern Jakarta.  The company is responsible for the operation, 
maintenance development and investment of the Capital City drinking water 
system.    
2. Interview with the customers – Sixty interviews were run.  Customers included 
residents of Cipinang Cempedak, Koja Selatan, and Tanjung Priok which are 
located in the Eastern Part of Jakarta and as indicated above fall within Thames 
PAM Jaya (TPJ) service area.  These areas were chosen because of several 
reasons.  First, they are connected to TPJ pipe networks.  Second, groundwater 
quality in the north-eastern part of Jakarta is brackish due to its location that is 
close to the sea which means they are highly dependent on the pipe water service.  
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Third, eastern part of Jakarta is known for its dense population, especially in the 
north-eastern area.  Thus, the areas are highly potential for the private sector to 
obtain profit.   
Customers interviewed range from low to high income households.  They are civil 
employees, pensioners, traders and labourers with monthly income varied from less 
than five hundred thousands Rupiah to more than five millions Rupiah.  The 
exchange rate of US Dollar to Rupiah in 2007 is approximately nine thousand and 
six hundred Rupiah per one US Dollar (Rp. 9,600.00/US$ 1.00).   Most customers 
own electronic appliances such as TV sets, radios and/or VCD players, even those 
who come from low income households.   
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Chapter Three – Literature Review 
3.1 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Public Services 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is the name used by the World Bank to refer to private 
sector participation in the management of what used to be, almost exclusively, public 
service infrastructure.  PPP was introduced as part of global economic reform during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Ariff and Iyer, 1995).  Poor performance of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1970s triggered the move towards PPP.  They emerged 
first in Great Britain under Thatcher governments in the early 1980s.  They were part of 
a neo-liberal economic agenda and have quickly spread to other countries all over the 
globe, both in the developed and developing countries (Bayliss and Cramer of 2001).  
PPP is commonly found in the management of railroad, water utilities, banking, electric 
power provision, oil and gas production, healthcare delivery, education, 
telecommunications, and transportation services. PPP in public infrastructure can be 
divided into five types according the allocation of key responsibilities as shown in the 
table below. 
Table 3.1 The Range of Private Involvement in Public Infrastructures and the 
Allocation of Key Responsibilities  
Types of 
Contract 
Service 
Contract 
Management 
Contract Lease Concession 
Build-Own-
Transfer 
(BOT) 
Divestiture 
Asset 
Ownership Public Public Public Public 
Private / 
public Private 
Capita 
Investment Public Public Public Private Private Private 
Commercial 
Risk Public Public Shared Private Private Private 
Operations / 
Maintenance 
Private / 
public Private Private Private Private Private 
Contract 
Duration 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 8-15 yrs 25-30 yrs 20-30 yrs Indefinitive 
Source: Budds and McGranahan. (2003). Are the Debates on Water Privatisation Missing the Point?  
Experiences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Environment & Urbanisation Vol. 15, pp. 87-114. 
Many governments invite private sector participation in their state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), in the form of Public Private Partnership (PPP), with the hope that the private 
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sector will run the enterprises more efficiently, bringing better service than the state 
could provide by infusing the enterprise with new capital, improved management 
practices, and better technologies.  Another reason is to shed state enterprises that are 
operating at a loss and draining governments’ funds.   
Thatcher, herself, in the early 1980s, justified private sector by agreeing that their 
involvement in state owned enterprises (SOEs) can raise revenue for the State, 
improve economic efficiency, reduce government interference in the economy, promote 
more widely share ownership, introduce competition and subject SOEs to market 
discipline (Prasad, 2007).  The following is a set of typical objectives pursued by private 
sector parties in SOEs, adopted from Prasad (2006) and Dinavo (1995).  They are 
obliged to: 
• achieve higher allocative and productive efficiency; 
• strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy; 
• improve the public sector’s financial position; 
• free resources for allocation to other important sectors such as social policy 
• maximise consumer choice; 
• promote competition; and  
• improve quality and efficiency of the goods and services provided by state-owned 
enterprises 
(Prasad, 2006, p. 672 and Dinavo, 1995, p. 5). 
Efficiency is the central point of private sector involvement in state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and economic growth becomes the reason for moving towards Public Private 
Partnership (PPP).  North American and Western European economists assume that 
by increasing economic efficiency, the national financial performance will automatically 
be improved.  This improvement, thus, brings net welfare gains and reduces poverty 
(Rodrik, 2004 and Bayliss and Cramer, 2001).  PPP in its implementation, however, is 
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not always this simple, especially when the object is of social importance, such as 
water. 
3.2 Public Private Partnership in Indonesia (PPP) 
Initiatives leading towards private sector involvement in Indonesia’s public services 
began in the 1980s during state economic policy reforms.  However, it was a slow 
process.  One explanation for this was the high degree of government involvement in 
the country’s economic activities.  Large numbers of enterprises in Indonesia were 
owned by the government.  There was a huge concern that sudden reform would 
cause disaster to the nation’s welfare.  When Public Private Partnership (PPP) was 
introduced in Indonesia, the country did not have an adequate system of social 
security.  With the absence of this system, a sudden withdrawal of government support 
increases the possibility of general destabilisation which may have resulted in the 
collapse of industrial and labour policies (Ariff and Iyer, 1995).  This is why Government 
of Indonesia opposed to changes.   
It was not until 1997, when Indonesia was hit hard by the Asian economic crisis that 
PPP came under serious consideration.  The Indonesian Government, finally, 
committed itself to involve the private sector in its state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a 
condition for the provision of financial assistance by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  The reasoning seems to have been that since private capital was fleeing the 
country it was necessary to change conditions which determined the nature of the 
market and allow foreign investment in basic utilities.   
3.3 Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Water Utilities 
As mentioned in my opening chapter over one billion people worldwide today do not 
have access to safe drinking water, especially in developing countries.  The World 
Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that in 2005, 1.6 million children under the age 
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of five (an average of over 4,000 every day) died from unsafe water and inadequate 
hygiene (Prasad, 2007).  Both maintenance and extension of water supply networks 
require considerable investments.  This is a dilemma that has changed the way we look 
at water from a social necessity to an economic imperative.   
This view of water as being of economic importance arose out of agreements reached 
in the International Conference on water and environment that took place in 1992 in 
Dublin, Ireland.  The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development or 
widely known as The Dublin Principles makes four points one of which is that “water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good.”  Thus water today not only has social value, but also economic value.   
Based on this view, Public Private Parnership (PPP), which involves operating the 
water supply system on a full cost recovery principle, becomes a solution that is often 
used as a rationale on which to justify the need for considerable capital investments in 
the maintenance and extension of water supply.  Efficiency is often the central point of 
this solution. Private sector can provide the much needed investment (new capital, 
better management practices and better technologies) to provide better service and to 
extend water services to the poor (WDM, 2006a).  Thus, it is believed that the private 
sector can increase efficiency in the management of water utilities much more than the 
government could ever do.   
Under Public Private Partnership (PPP), water becomes an economic good.  This 
however, is not without problems.  Given that water is a basic necessity, affordability of 
the service becomes a major issue. The water supply system is a natural monopoly 
and as such it is not free from problems associated with lack of competition, regardless 
of who owns or operates it (Prasad, 2007). Such problems may include charging higher 
prices or lowering production costs by decreasing the quality of service.  In these 
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circumstances, government intervention, either through public management or through 
appropriate regulation, is often proposed. 
PPP in water services is usually negotiated through contracts between public 
authorities and private companies.  Figure 3.1 shows the main stages which have to be 
followed in the establishment of PPP.  These stages include: (1) preparation state; (2) 
pre-qualification stage; (3) bidding stage; (4) contract agreement stage; and (5) 
monitoring and transfer stage. 
Figure 3.1 PPP Life Cycle 
Source: Water Supply Development Supporting Agency (2005) 
Contracts are usually in the form of Cooperation Agreement.  According Bakker (2003), 
the majority of Cooperation Agreements are granted on a concession basis. Under this 
type of contract, the private contractor manages the entire utility and is required to 
invest in the maintenance and expansion of the system at their own commercial risk 
(Budds and McGranahan, 2003).  The role of the government, on the other hand, is 
predominantly regulatory.  
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In a concession, the government’s rights and obligation to provide services and 
maintain the infrastructure are handed over to private firms under a specified contract 
to achieve the agreed targets under time duration of 25-30 years (Hidayat, 2006).  
However, in this type of contract, the government still owns the assets which mean 
after the contract is finished, responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure is returned to the government. 
In Indonesia drinking water service, Cooperation Agreements are mainly granted on 
Build-Own Transfer (BOT) and Concession basis (Table 3.1).  The BOT type can be 
found in several cities in the provinces in Indonesia.  These cities include Medan of 
North Sumatera Province, Jambi of Jambi Province, and Palembang of South 
Sumatera Province.  The concession type on the other hand can found in Batam which 
according to the Water Supply Development Supporting Agency (2005) had some 
success stories.  The Capital City’s piped water service is also managed under 
concession agreements, but not as successful as Batam.  Jakarta drinking water 
service which will be further discussed and analysed in this research.   
3.4 Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta Drinking Water Service 
From 1922 until late 1997 Jakarta water utilities were managed by the Government 
owned water supply company, Perusahaan Air Minum DKI Jakarta (PAM Jaya) (Lanti, 
2006).  However, due to its inability to provide drinking water for the rapidly increasing 
population that reached four percent annually, in 1998 the management was 
transferred to two of the largest private water companies in the world, namely Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux (French) and Thames Water International (British) which were 
granted a twenty five years concession contract with PAM Jaya (Bakker, 2006).   The 
contract is in force since 1 February 1998 and will end on 1 February 2023. 
According to Tutuko (2001), the current Technical Director of PAM Jaya, the process of 
concession took two years.  Starting on June 1995, the President of the Republic of 
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Indonesia, Suharto at the time, announced that the Jakarta Water Supply System 
would be organized on a sector basis using the River Ciliwung as a dividing line.  The 
Government of Indonesia then announced its decision to split Jakarta water supply 
system in two concession areas, Jakarta East and Jakarta West, with River Ciliwung 
being the boundary.   
Two private companies were directly appointed by President of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Suharto, without public consultation nor a selection of bidding process to 
undertake operation, maintenance and management of water supply services in the 
area.  They were Thames Water International (TWI) joined with local partner Kekarpola 
Airindo (KATI), now known as Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), for the eastern area of Jakarta 
and Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux joined with local partner Garuda Dipta Semesta (GDS), 
now known as PAM Lyonnaise Jaya (PALYJA), for the western area. 
PAM Jaya and the two private companies above reached an agreement and signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 6 October 1995, which required the 
consortia to prepare a feasibility study that had to be completed within 4 months from 
the date of signing the MoU.  The final agreement was reached and the contract was 
signed on 6 June 1997 that came to be effective on 1 February 1998, which coincided 
with the economical and political crisis in Indonesia. 
Due to the crisis the private firms asked for their agreements to be renegotiated. The 
changed circumstances had at least temporarily made it extremely difficult for them to 
meet the conditions imposed, and it was clear that they would be unable to meet the 
financial and operational performance objectives.  They proposed a review of water 
charges based on operational and maintenance costs, poor efficiency, and investment 
delays. PAM Jaya needed to reschedule debts, adjustments had to be made to 
technical targets, and the management of human resources along with other aspects of 
the contract also needed to be clarified.  The request was agreed to and an amended 
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and restated Agreement of Cooperation was finalized on 19 September 2001 and 
officially signed by the governor of Jakarta on 22 October 2001 (Tutuko, 2001). 
3.5 Legal Aspects of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Indonesia 
During the early days of negotiation over private company involvement, several existing 
regulations were critically reviewed.  Those regulations included: 
• Law Number 5 of year 1962 regarding Regional Government Owned Companies  
• Regulation of Minister of Home Affair Number 3 of year 1986 regarding Third Party 
Participation on Regional Investment 
• Regulation of Minister of Home Affair Number 4 of year 1990 regarding Procedure 
of Cooperation Between Regional Government Owned Company and a Third Party  
• Decree of Minister of Home Affair Number 690.900-327 of year 1994 regarding 
Monitoring of Financial Performance of PDAMs 
• Government Regulation Number 20 of year 1994 regarding Shares Ownership of 
Company Established on Foreign Capital Investment Framework  
According to Shofiani (2003), however, none of the above regulations specify in detail 
procedural guidelines that must be followed by public private partnership engaged in 
supplying drinking water.    
An integrated framework covering Public Private Partnership (PPP) concerning drinking 
water supply was established just after the PPP policy concerning the Jakarta water 
supply system was decided.  Those regulations include: 
• Instruction of Minister of Home Affairs Number 9 of year 1995 regarding 
Implementation of Regulation of Minister of Home Affairs Number 4 of year 1990. 
• Instruction of Minister of Home Affairs Number 21 of year 1996 regarding 
Cooperation Guidelines between PDAM and Private Sector. 
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• Presidential Decree Number 7 of year 1998 regarding Public Private Partnership on 
Infrastructure Development and/or Management  
• Decree of Minister of National Development Planning Number 
KEP.319/PET/10/1998 regarding Implementation of Public Private Partnership on 
Infrastructure Development and/or Management. 
• Decree of Minister of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure Number 
409/KPTS/2002 regarding Guidelines of Public Private Partnership on Provision 
and Management of Drinking Water and Sanitation. 
Recently, a new regulation was introduced, known as the Presidential Regulation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 67 of 2005 concerning the Cooperation between the 
Government and Business Entities in the Provision of Infrastructure.  With this new 
regulation in place, the Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1998 is no longer effective.   
3.5.1 The Cooperation between the Government and the Business Entities in 
the Provision of Infrastructures 
The cooperation between the Government and the Business Entities in the provision of 
infrastructures is regulated under Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2005.  All 
shapes of private sector involvement in state owned enterprises are regulated is 
controlled under this regulation, including those that exist in drinking water 
infrastructure development and management.  The content of the Presidential 
Regulation consist of the objective, type, form and principle of the cooperation; 
identification and stipulation of the project executed by virtue of the cooperation 
agreement; cooperation project based on the initiatives of the business entities; initial 
tariffs and tariff adjustment; risk management and government support; business entity 
procurement procedure within the framework of cooperation agreement; cooperation 
agreement; provision of infrastructure by virtue of an operation permit; and transitory 
provisions. 
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There are several points in the content of the Presidential Regulation that I would like 
to stress.  Those include: 
• The purpose of the cooperation should be to: meet the financial requirement in a 
sustainable manner in providing the infrastructure through the mobilization of 
private funds; improve the quantity, quality and efficiency of service through fair 
competition; improve the quality of management and maintenance in the provision 
of infrastructure; and encourage the utilization of the principle of user paying for the 
services that they receive, or in certain cases take into consideration the users’ 
ability to pay (Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 67 of 
2005, p. 4). 
• Infrastructure for drinking water, in which, a cooperation can be entered with the 
private sector comprise of the structure used to extract raw water, transmission 
network, distribution network, and drinking water procession installation 
(Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 67 of 2005, p. 4). 
• The cooperation on the provision of drinking water infrastructure between the 
Government of Indonesia and the private sector shall be carried out based on 8 
principles, including fair, open, transparency, competition, accountable, mutually 
beneficial, reciprocal need, and mutually supportive (Presidential Regulation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 67 of 2005 article 6 of Chapter II, p. 4). 
• Private sector procurement procedure within the framework of the Cooperation 
Agreement shall be carried out by means of a public tender and the Minister of the 
Institution shall determine the tender winner based on the proposal from the 
procurement committee (Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia 
Number 67 of 2005, p. 10).    
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3.6 Indonesia’s Water Resources Management 
Up until year 2004, Indonesia did not have a legal framework to regulate the use and 
management of its water resources.  The only regulation in existence was the Irrigation 
Law which hardly mentions drinking water.  This became a problem when the need for 
an adequate supply of drinking water intensified owing to population growth and 
increased competition for limited water resources.   To overcome this problem, in 2004 
the Government passed a new law to regulate the management of water resources. 
Today, the drinking water supply system in Indonesia is regulated under the Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2004 concerning Water Resources.  The 
implementation of the Law is regulated by the GoI specifically the Presidential Office, 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
3.6.1 Water Resources Law 
The Water Resources Law Number 7 of 2004 is a new law replacing the previous Law 
No. 11 of 1974 on Water Resources which was no longer applicable under current 
social, economic and environmental conditions which are so fundamentally affected by 
globalization.  This law makes provision for the sustainable management of water 
resources, water supply and wastewater, and the participation of the private sector, as 
well as cooperatives and communities.   
Like the previous Law, the Water Resources Law Number 7 of 2004 regulates the 
exploitation of all type of water resources in Indonesia, including surface water, ground 
water, rainwater, and sea water.  The difference is it provides clauses on private sector 
participation in the development of water and sanitation which were not included under 
previous legislation.  Indeed, the involvement of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) in the 
management of the Eastern Jakarta water supply from 1998 to 2004 was not regulated 
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under primary legislation and only fell under specific contract regulations negotiated by 
TPJ.   
The new Water Law established tradable water rights and redefined water as an 
economic good which is in line with the evolution of international governance 
frameworks over the past two decades (Bakker, 2005).  The new legal definition of 
water rights, however, has raised issues that are actively contested by Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), consumers, Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs) and civil society groups.  These parties have launched campaigns and court 
procedures which challenge the legitimacy of the new water law, arguing that free and 
open access to water is a basic human right.     
3.6.2 Development of Drinking Water Supply System 
The development of drinking water supply system is controlled under the Government 
Regulation Number 16 of 2005 which regulates the implementation of Law No. 7 of 
year 2004.  The Regulation is issued to formulate the role, responsibility, rules and 
procedures on how the Local Government will manage the water supply and 
wastewater system and how the private sector participate in the water supply 
development including the establishment of Water Supply Development Supporting 
Agency. 
The objectives of Government Regulations concerning the development of drinking 
water service include the need to achieve: 
• a high quality service management system that is affordable;  
• a balance between the needs of consumers and the drinking water service 
enterprise; and,  
• increase efficiency and better coverage of the consumer area.     
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To achieve the above objectives large amount of investment is needed.  As it is stated 
in the Government Regulation that capital investment is required for construction, 
expansion, and improvement in technology and management system.  Sources of 
investment may come from State Grant, loan, small economic enterprises manage by 
the community (Koperasi), Private Sector/business entities, Public, and/or other 
sources according the existing regulation.  Therefore, the Government Regulation 
supports private sector involvement in Indonesia’s water service.   
3.7 Tariffs 
The tariff (Rupiah per cubic meter) is the charge levied to consumers for customer 
services.  These charges include volumetric charges, fixed charges and meter charges 
(Appendix A).  Since 3 July 2006, water tariffs are determined in accordance with the 
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Regulation Number 23 of 2006 
concerning the Technical Guidance and the Municipal Drinking Water Enterprise 
(PDAM) Drinking Water Tariff Control.  According to the Regulation, tariff levels are 
based on 6 principles, including affordability for the user and fairness; quality of 
service; full cost recovery; efficiency of water utility; transparency and accountability; 
and the conservation of raw water. 
Affordability is a major issue in private sector involvement which is profit oriented.  
Affordability, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation, is the tariff applied to 
water users whose income is equal to the provincial minimum wage and that the cost of 
drinking water shall not exceed 4 percent of a user’s income.   
To prevent debts due to inflation, tariffs are adjusted.  Tariff adjustment may be made 
every year with the approval from the Governor.  Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) submits the 
proposal to the Regulatory Body to get approval from the Governor of DKI Jakarta.  
Tariffs set should be based on 6 principles, including affordability and fairness; quality 
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of service; full cost recovery; efficiency of water utility; transparency and accountability; 
and the conservation of raw water.  If the adjustment is approved, then the technical 
targets and service standards will be adjusted according to availability of capital. 
What the consumers pay for water, according to the Regulation, is based on a 
progressive tariff with cross subsidies between the high and low-income households. 
Progressive tariff system is used to achieve sustainability of raw water because it is 
dependent on the quantity consumed by a household.  Cross subsidies, on the other 
hand, are used to achieve the social objectives.  Table 3.2 show the classification of 
consumers. 
Table 3.2 Description of Consumer Groups 
Consumer Group Description 
Group I Social institutions, orphanages, religious facilities and public 
hydrant 
Group II Public hospitals, very poor households, water storage and tanks 
Group IIIA Middle-income households, middle-income flats, non-commercial 
bodies, kiosk, small workshops, small-scale business, and small 
domestic business  
Group IVA Upper-middle-income households, embassies, consulates, 
government offices, foreign representatives, private commercial 
bodies, schools, training centres, military facilities, medium class 
workshops, barbershops, tailors, small restaurants, private 
hospitals and laboratories, clinics, law offices, small hotels, small 
industries, superb apartments 
Group IVB Stars hotels, beauty saloons, night clubs, banks, large scale 
workshops, large trading, sky scrapers buildings, factories, 
amusement parks, fantasy lands 
Group V/Special Tanjung Priok Harbour 
Source: Governor of DKI Jakarta Regulation No. 11 of 2007 
3.8 Standard of Service Performance 
To indicate the success or failure of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta 
Drinking Water Service, a Standard of Service Performance is prepared at the 
beginning of the twenty five years contract and agreed to by both parties as stated in 
the Cooperation Agreement (22 October 2001).  This include the State owned Jakarta 
Water Enterprise, Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 
(PAM Jaya) acting as the first party, and the privately owned water enterprise which 
  
31 
operates in Eastern Jakarta, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) acting as the second party.  The 
Standard of Service Performance is divided into two types, service standards and 
technical targets.  Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) in this case needs to fulfill the following 
standards. 
3.8.1 Service Standards 
Service standard indicators include water quality, water pressure, time of respond to 
complaints, repair for interruption in distribution network, and the time to set up new 
connections.   
a. Water Quality 
PAM Jaya applies a water quality standard subject to the Decree of the Ministry of 
Health Number 416/MENKES/X/PER/1990.  The standard, as shown in the Appendix 
B, has two levels, one for potable water, which means directly drinkable, and the other 
for clean water which should be boiled before drinking.  An ambitious target was set in 
the Cooperation Agreement that Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) will supply potable water to 
its consumers by early 2008.  This target, however, is too ambitious.  Consumers of 
TPJ up to this day (15 November 2008) still receive non-potable water. 
b. Water Pressure 
Many large urban water supply networks suffer from low pressure and this includes 
Jakarta.  Almost 26 percent of the customers experience some problems with the 
continuity of piped water.  The standard of water pressure is at 0.3 – 0.75 atm. 
Table 3.3  Water Pressure Target 
Percentage of Cooperation Region Water Pressure End of Year 3 End of Year 4 End of Year 5 End of Year 10 
≥ 0.75 atm 38% 46% 50% 100% 
0.3 – 0.75 atm - 30% 35% - 
Source: Tutuko, K. (2002). Jakarta Water Supply. Jakarta 
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c. Time of Respond to Complaints 
Consumers’ complaints can be divided into three types including burst main, break in 
water supply and water quality complaints.  The agreed times allowed to respond to 
these complaints respectively are less than 2 hours, less than 4 hours and less than 6 
hours.   
d. Repair for Interruption in Distribution Network 
Distribution network here is divided into three types of pipe, including tertiary pipe 
(diameter of more than 100 mm), secondary pipe (diameter of 150 mm - 250 mm) and 
primary pipe (diameter of more than 250 mm).  Pipes should be fixed in less than 6 
hours, less than 12 hours and less than 72 hours respectively under normal condition. 
e. The Time to Set Up  New Connections 
The standard time to set up a new connection is less than 1 hour.   
3.8.2 Technical Targets 
Table 3.4 below shows the technical targets of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) in accordance 
to the amended and restated Cooperation Agreement of October 2001. 
Table 3.4 Technical Targets of Thames PAM Jaya 
Technical Targets Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 25 
Volume of Water Billed  
(million m3) 
91.96 105.90 117.94 121.83 131.32 183.50 
Water Production (lt/dt) 8,523 7,827 7,408 7,282 7,309 7,758 
UFW (%) 58.07 51.74 45.74 45.03 43.03 25.00 
Number of Connections (unit) 278,083 285,735 304,303 315,126 335,413 430,813 
Service Coverage Ratio (%) 57 57 59 60 62 About 100 
Source: Tutuko, K. (2002). Jakarta Water Supply. Jakarta 
a. Volume of Water Billed 
Volume of water billed here means the amount of treated water that is produced, 
delivered and sold to customer.  The amount of volume sold is greatly affected by non 
revenue water (NRW). 
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b. Production Capacity 
Production capacity is the amount of water produced by the water treatment plant.  
Poor quality and limited amount of raw water availability can negatively affect 
production capacity.    Raw water quality is usually identified by the level of turbidity 
and coli form presence.  In the Capital City, problems lay on poor condition of existing 
sanitation facilities and waste water system.  
c. Non Revenue Water (NRW) 
Non revenue water (NRW) describes water that has been produced and is “lost” before 
it reaches the customer. Losses can be physical losses, through leaks, or apparent 
losses, through theft or metering inaccuracies. High levels of NRW are 
disadvantageous to the financial viability of water utilities, as well to the quality of water 
itself. NRW is typically measured as the volume of water "lost" as a share of net water 
produced. However, it is often presented in percentage.  NRW in Eastern Jakarta 
remains very high, up to 52 percent in 2006 (JWSRB, 2007).  The World Bank 
recommends that NRW should be less than 25 percent. 
d. The Number of Connections 
The number of connections describes the number of households that are connected to 
TPJ water service.  Throughout 1998-2006, TPJ has succeeded in extending pipe 
networks to 885 km (Media Indonesia, 12 June 2007). 
e. Service Coverage 
Service coverage is the percentage of population served by the company.  Another 
ambitious target set the private companies is 100 percent coverage by 2003. 
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f. Financial Investment 
In 2006, TPJ invested Rp. 47.234 billion for rehabilitation of networks, production unit 
and water meter, as well for installing new district water meter (Media Indonesia, 12 
June 2007).  
3.9 Sanctions and Penalties 
According to the Restated Cooperation Agreement of 22 October 2001, sanctions can 
be applied to Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) when at any time it fails to meet the service 
standards which include water quality supply to customers, pressure at customer 
connection, routine interruption in distribution network, emergency supplies, and/or 
verified customer complaints.  Sanction and penalty can also be applied to TPJ for not 
complying with obligations related to assets and investment program. 
The Cooperation Agreement also explains the procedure of payment.  Any penalty 
payable by Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) should be paid to PAM Jaya and directly to its 
bank account which is opened specifically for the purpose of sanctions and penalties.  
However, if at the same time there remains monies owing by PAM Jaya to TPJ, after 
fulfilment of the obligation to pay PAM Jaya primary requirements, the Regulatory Body 
financial requirement and the Local Government of DKI Jakarta in full, TPJ have the 
right to set-off the amount of penalty against the monies owing by PAM Jaya the 
amount to set-off accordingly.  Any use of funds in the bank account should be for the 
benefit of the project.  Sanctions and penalties will be further discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
3.10 Conclusion 
It was unfortunate for TPJ that the introduction of PPP coincided with the political and 
economic crisis of 1998.  This made it difficult to launch the joint enterprise in a 
favourable and supportive environment.  Proper regulations were not in place and 
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several legal enactments since 1998 may have changed the operating environment to 
safeguard the interests of the community but it is difficult to generate much sympathy 
for the difficulties the company has had to face.  They were complicit in the closed 
agreement negotiated with President Suharto.  They have continued to use their 
agreements with the authorities as their main point of reference and challenged the 
application of new regulations as breach of contract.  
The physical state of the treatment and reticulation infrastructure inherited by the joint 
enterprise also presented a challenge but must have been carefully examined by the 
companies before they committed themselves to a relatively long term contract.  A 
proper sociological and demographic reconnaissance would have alerted them to the 
process of rapid urbanisation and the axiomatic growth of the city.  This brings us to the 
following questions: Did they foresee an increasing number of clients as a promise of 
greater profitability? According to the privatisation doctrine did they think that better 
management and strategic investment would simply result in increase efficiency and 
result in a more profitable enterprise?  
In the next chapter I will review their performance by comparing it with the history of the 
service when it was a public utility.  
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Chapter Four – History of Jakarta Water Supply Performance 
This chapter presents an unencumbered history of Jakarta water service delivery 
from1993 to 2007.  This will enable the reader to see the changes that occurred over 
two periods, first when the service was provided by the Jakarta Water Supply 
Enterprise, PAM Jaya, from 1993 to 1997 and later from 1998 to 2007 when it was 
taken over by a public-private partnership company by the name of Thames PAM Jaya 
(TPJ). 
The review of performance will be in the next chapter (Chapter five) serve as a 
baseline against which the various opinions of a wide range of stakeholders can be 
placed in perspective.   
4.1 PAM Jaya Performance 1993 to 1997, before PPP was put in place 
Table 4.1 below shows PAM Jaya achievements including production capacity, total 
number of connections, service coverage ratio, non revenue water and the volume of 
water billed from 1993 to 1997.  Over its period of management PAM Jaya was able to 
achieve improvements in all indicators, except for non revenue water (NRW). 
Table 4.1 Achievements of PAM Jaya (1993 to 1997) 
Year 
Production 
Capacity 
(million m3) 
Total 
Connections* 
Total 
Population 
Served 
Service 
Coverage 
Ratio (%) 
Non 
Revenue 
Water (%) 
Volume of 
Water Billed 
(million m3) 
1993 298.11 324 433 2 488 491 38 53 158 
1994 323.08 349 849 2 658 852 38 52 168 
1995 317.31 362 618 2 755 897 39 57 165 
1996 308.77 393 746 2 992 606 41 57 176 
1997 382.00 428 764 3 258 606 42 57 191 
*In average 7.6 people per connection 
Source:  Ardhianie (2005) and Azdan (2001) 
4.1.1 Production Capacity 
Throughout the period 1993 to 1997, PAM Jaya was able to improve water production 
by 22 percent (Figure 4.1).  However, due to high non revenue water (NRW) losses of 
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over 50 percent, PAM Jaya was only able to collect revenue on just under half the 
amount of water produced.  The estimated water loss includes 40 percent due to pipe 
leakages in the distribution network and 10 percent due to unpaid bills.  The high NRW 
was the major reason why PAM Jaya was unable to improve its net profit throughout 
1993 to 1997 even though overall revenue increased (Azdan, 2001). 
Figure 4.1 PAM Jaya Production Capacity (1993-1997) 
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Source:  Ardhianie (2005) and Azdan (2001) 
4.1.2 Service Coverage 
Throughout PAM Jaya’s tenure they were able to improve their service coverage from 
38 percent of their allocated area in 1993 to 42 percent in 1997.  Over this period PAM 
Jaya installed 104,331 units.  This means that on average 20,866 new household 
connections (5 percent) were installed each year.  The number of people served 
increased by a total of 770,000 people, an average annual increase of approximately 
195,000 people (Azdan, 2001). 
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Figure 4.2 PAM Jaya Service Coverage Ratio (1993-1997) 
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Source:  Ardhianie (2005) and Azdan (2001) 
 
4.2 Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) Water Service Performance 1998 to 2007 
When Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) took over the service, their performance was 
monitored by PAM Jaya using a monitoring and evaluation methodology known as 
Procedure on Performance Supervision and Evaluation System (PPSES).  The use of 
this was specified in the Cooperation Agreement of 2001. In monitoring and evaluating 
the company’s performance, PAM Jaya used technical targets and service standards 
agreed to by all parties, i.e. PAM Jaya and the two concessionaires, TPJ and PAM 
Lyonnaise des Eaux (Palyja) as indicators of achievement.   
Each private sector agency has to report to PAM Jaya on technical and service 
standards achieved each month, annually and every five years.  If private sector 
companies could not achieve the targets set, sanctions could be applied.  This however 
did not work.  Even though sanctions were applied they could not be enforced and 
companies basically did what they wanted. 
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4.2.1 Service Standard 
The service standards set for private sector operators in the Cooperation Agreement of 
2001 included:  water quality, water pressure, time to respond to complaints, the length 
of time service was suspended while repairs were carried out on the distribution 
network, and the time taken to install new connections.  These are reviewed 
immediately below. 
4.2.1.1 Water Quality 
A survey of customer satisfaction with Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) water service was 
conducted by Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) in 2005.  Results show 
that since TPJ commenced operations in 1998, they have been able to improve the 
quality of treated water to a standard acceptable to the Ministry of Health Regulation, 
PERMENKES No. 416/Men Kes/Per/IX/1990 (PAM Jaya, 2007).  However, due to the 
high number of leaks on its distribution pipes which allows for the ingress of foreign 
matter, until today TPJ has not been able to provide its customers with potable drinking 
water.    
4.2.1.2  Water Pressure 
Owing to low water pressure Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) is also still unable to provide 
sufficient water at a number of household connections in its coverage area.  As a 
consequence those closest to the head of the system get enough and those further 
away go short.  According to the target agreed in the Cooperation Agreement, by the 
end of 2007 water pressure at all customer points should be delivered at more than 
0.75 atm.  It is still widely acknowledged that water pressure continues to drop between 
the head of the system to the periphery. This has not improved over time. In a July 
2006 survey data showed that 63 percent of all connection points (customer points) 
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received water flowing at a pressure at more than 0.75 atm.  By the end of June 2007 
only 31 percent of clients were receiving water at this level (PAM Jaya, 2007).  This 
was caused by over extending the number of new connections. Since 1998, Thames 
PAM Jaya has installed over ninety nine thousand new connections. 
4.2.1.3  Time Taken to Respond to Complaints 
According to a survey carried out by PAM Jaya in 2007, there had been no significant 
improvement in the time it took for Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) to respond to complaints. 
4.2.1.4  Time Taken to Repair Faults in the Distribution Network 
Not all the news is bad. Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has improved repair times and the 
consequent interruption to water availability. This improvement holds for cases 
involving tertiary, secondary and primary pipes. 
4.2.1.5  New Connections 
A survey done by PAM Jaya in 2007 shows that Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has been 
able to reduce the time taken to install new connections to just under one hour.  In 
September 2006, only 46 percent of new connections took this long but by June 2007 
this had risen to over ninety eight percent.  
4.2.2 Technical Targets 
Technical targets set for Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) included volume of water billed, 
number of connections, production capacity, non revenue water (NRW), and service 
coverage ratio. Table 4.2 and table 4.3 present the targets and achievements of TPJ. 
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Table 4.2 Target of TPJ 1998-2007 
Year 
Volume of 
Water Billed 
(m3) 
Water 
Production 
(lt/sec) 
Non Revenue 
Water (%) 
Number of 
Connection 
(units) 
Service 
Coverage 
Ratio (%) 
1998 91,960,000 8,523 58.07 278,083 57.00 
1999 105,900,000 7,827 51.74 285,735 57.00 
2000 117,940,000 7,408 45.74 304,303 59.00 
2001 121,830,000 7,282 45.03 315,126 60.00 
2002 131,320,000 7,309 43.03 335,413 62.00 
2003 141,400,000 8,231 44.43 360,469 64.40 
2004 140,390,000 8,860 48.20 368,250 66.80 
2005 144,000,000 8,235 44.55 379,032 69.20 
2006 146,280,000 8,078 42.58 387,158 71.60 
2007 148,474,056 7,925 34.03 391,205 74.00 
Source: Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (2007) 
Table 4.3 Achievements of TPJ 1998-2007 
Year 
Volume of 
Water Billed    
(m3) 
Water 
Production 
(lt/sec) 
Non Revenue 
Water (%) 
Number of 
Connection 
(units) 
Service 
Coverage 
Ratio (%) 
1998 91,962,344 7,799 58.07 278,083 57.00 
1999 105,900,328 7,827 51.74 285,735 57.00 
2000 117,944,722 7,429 45.74 304,303 59.00 
2001 120,422,331 8,054 49.90 320,282 60.97 
2002 128,960,781 8,032 48.23 336,550 62.17 
2003 142,791,817 8,231 44.43 360,469 65.59 
2004 143,569,487 8,860 48.20 368,250 67.06 
2005 137,736,032 8,729 49.58 364,551 66.45 
2006 131,818,196 8,903 52.56 374,211 67.26 
2007 122,852,892 8,303 52.64 377,383 67.30 
Source: Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (2007) 
4.2.2.1  Volume of Water Billed 
The volume of water billed was set as a priority target because it directly determines 
the revenue received from customers, which is then shared between PAM Jaya and 
Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ).  Up until 2004 TPJ was able to meet the target. However, in 
following years TPJ failed to deliver.  This was mainly due to the increasing number of 
households drawing off water that they did not pay for (non revenue water, NRW). 
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Figure 4.3 Thames PAM Jaya Volume of Water Billed (1998-2007) 
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Source: Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (2007) 
4.2.2.2  Number of Connections 
During the first few years after 1997, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) was able to increase the 
number of connections by 44 percent (Shofiani, 2003).  Steady progress continued to 
be made up to 2004.  However, just increasing the number of connections, when there 
is already not enough water to go round does not make good sense. Clients cannot be 
made to pay for water they do not receive.  
Figure 4.4 Thames PAM Jaya Total connections (1998-2007) 
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4.2.2.3  Production Capacity 
Figure 4.5 shows that Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has been able to meet its water 
production targets, and repeat this achievement several times.  Given this success one 
would expect that by now all residents of eastern Jakarta would enjoy access to piped 
water.  Unfortunately this is not the case.  Due to high non revenue water (NRW) rates 
there is still not enough to reach genuine paying clients. 
Figure 4.5 Thames PAM Jaya Production Capacity (1998-2007) 
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Source: Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (2007) 
4.2.2.4  Non Revenue Water (NRW) 
Despite all of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) efforts to reduce non revenue water (NRW) by 
tracing down and cutting off illegal connections, as well as rehabilitating old pipes in the 
distribution network, water losses continue to exceed 50 percent.   If it was meeting its 
NRW target TPJ would have reduced NRW down to 34 percent.  However, throughout 
2002 to 2007, NRW increased by 4.41 percent, from 48.23 percent in 2002 to 52.64 
percent in 2007.  The over all proportion of total production available to paying 
customers has declined.  
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Figure 4.6 Thames PAM Jaya Non Revenue Water (1998-2007) 
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4.2.2.5  Service Coverage Ratio 
Figure 4.7 shows that up to 2004 Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) performance in improving 
service coverage was consistent with targets, but the company has been unable to 
maintain this record.  In 2007 TPJ service to coverage ratio should have increased to 
over seventy percent but TPJ has only able to bring the ratio up to 67 percent. 
Figure 4.7 Thames PAM Jaya Service Coverage Ratio (1998-2007) 
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4.3 Conclusions 
In expectation of higher production, greater efficiency and delivery of a better service, 
the monitoring system put in place to keep an eye on private companies imposed a 
more comprehensive set of measures and a set higher standard than that which had 
applied to PAM Jaya.  This makes it a little difficult to compare and contrast Pre and 
post Public Private Partnership (PPP) management.  However the performance 
categories which both shared can be easily summarized 
Table 4.4 Comparative Performance 
PAM Jaya Thames PAM Jaya Measure 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 
Production capacity  22% 3% 3% 
Number of connections 24% 17% 11% 
Service coverage ratio 4% 5% 5% 
Non Revenue Water Increased by 4% Reduced by 10% Increased by 4% 
Volume of water billed 17% 28% Reduced by 4 % 
On the overall performance of PAM Jaya and Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) in each five 
years time interval, PAM Jaya shows higher percentage of improvement than TPJ.  
This is especially shown in the achievements made by both companies in production 
capacity and number of connections (Table 4.4).  However it must be observed that 
TPJ had more capital to invest.  What is not shown here but is discussed in the next 
chapter, TPJ had the initial support of President Suharto an influential investor who 
was keen to see the enterprise make money for his family so the conditions under 
which TPJ operated were much more favorable than those that PAM Jaya had to work 
with.  Given this advantage it is surprising that TPJ has done no better than PAM Jaya 
The figures presented in this review indicate that the systemic challenges of theft and 
mistreatment of the reticulation system by un-paying clients remains a problem. Private 
companies are just as likely to be mistreated as a government service. The issue of 
whether water should be provided free of charge is a matter that is resolved by direct 
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action and strictly speaking a ‘natural’ system of cross subsidization of the poor by the 
rich appears to be a reality.    Just how the different stakeholders see the situation is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five – Interview Results, Discussion and Analyses 
This chapter summarizes, discusses and analyses the result of interviews with different 
respondents identified in Chapter Two.  These respondents are stakeholders of the 
East Jakarta water supply system: Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB), 
government institutions (BAPPENAS and Department of Public Works), state owned 
Jakarta water enterprise (PAM Jaya), Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), World Bank, and TPJ 
customers.   
I have sketched a brief background for each of the stakeholders and presented both 
their opinions and informed views on the privatization of the service 
5.1 Interview with Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) was established in October 2001, 
three years before Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) took over the operation of the East 
Jakarta water supply system from the state owned Jakarta Water Enterprise (PAM 
Jaya).  It is the responsibility of JWSRB to ensure the development of good quality 
water and an affordable water supply; achieve a balance between the interests of water 
customers and service providers; improve efficiency and extend service coverage 
(Anwar, 2004, p. 6).   
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) was an important player in the 
formulation of the Restated Cooperation Agreement (RCA) which stipulated that the 
regulatory body would continue to perform a leading role in service provision: 
• Coordinate governmental authorities in a manner consistent with implementation of 
the Agreement of Cooperation; 
• Monitor  operators’ performance; 
• Propose tariff adjustments to the Government of Jakarta as put forward by the 
operators and PAM Jaya; 
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• Develop mechanisms for dispute settlement with customers; and 
• Mediate  disagreements or disputes between parties prior to referral to experts or 
arbitration 
(Anwar, 2004, p. 7) 
The fact that Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) has a role in collecting 
and publishing information about service providers which to promote competition 
between players has generated a lot of useful information. In comparison with other 
government agencies they are particularly open and willing to share their data. During 
discussions several issues were raised about Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the 
supply of water to Jakarta including the performance of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) and 
weak law enforcement. Although these might be considered to be sensitive matters 
JWSRB staffs were particularly forthright. 
According to Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB), the process of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) in Jakarta drinking water service was directly linked to the 
former President, Suharto.  However, the idea of PPP did not come from him.  
Corruption and cronyism were evident in the process.  During Suharto’s leadership, 
any international corporation that wanted to take over the operations of a utility network 
had to find an Indonesian firm to act as a partner. A firm basically owned by Suharto 
family members or cronies showed a keen interest.  British Thames Water International 
(TWI) was partnered with the Sigit Group (run by Sigit Harjojudanto, Suharto’s eldest 
son) and this was all arranged without having to go through the normal public tendering 
process. British Thames Water International was awarded a twenty five years 
concession to run the operation and finance the Eastern Jakarta Water supply.   
As a result of this strong political interference in the Public Private Partnership (PPP), 
little interest was shown in improving the Jakarta water service.  Only one of the four 
targets agreed to was achieved by the company.  As shown in the previous chapter 
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(figure 4.5), Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) was able to reach the target for water production.  
However, the quality of the service continued to be poor.  Investment was not pro-poor 
based.  Due to weak law enforcement the system of cross subsidy between high 
income and low income households did not work as well as it might.  A default system 
of cross subsidization under which water was basically stolen from the company 
favoured the poor. 
The loss of non revenue water (NRW) continues to be high in the Thames PAM Jaya 
(TPJ) service area. As pointed out in the previous chapter (Figure 4.7), in 2007 this 
represented 52 percent of total production.  A considerable volume of water is stolen 
which greatly contributes to this problem, but apart from that there are technical 
problems such as leaking pipes.  A staff member of Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory 
Body (JWSRB) believes that unequal distribution of water, especially to the poor, is the 
root of the problem.  Like many other private sector enterprises, TPJ interest is profit 
oriented.  In choosing its customers, TPJ focuses on those who are able to pay for 
connections to water mains in the hope of securing a reliable supply of water.  Those 
who are unable to pay must find other sources of water which leads to a high level of 
theft. It can therefore be argued that one of the best ways for TPJ to reduce NRW 
would be by improving its service by taking the poor into favorable consideration.  
This is not what Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) does.  Their principal tactic to reduce non 
revenue water (NRW) is to find and cut off illegal connections.  The problem with this 
method is that it is very difficult to stop people from making illegal connection in other 
places.  As water is a basic need which people cannot live without, the motivation for 
breaking the law is very powerful.  TPJ needs to understand that Jakarta is a very 
complex city, with a population that exceeds the reach of its services. Many residents 
are squatters who build their homes illegally on land belonging to others, including 
government land, and areas which are often classified for uses other than housing. 
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High levels of insecurity and a sense of temporary residence creates a situation in 
which people feel they should take any opportunity to make their lives easier. This 
sense of opportunism discourages even modest investment and encourages theft.  If 
Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) worked with the people and asked for a modest fee to 
legitimize connections less damage would be done to the network, cleaner water would 
be delivered, non revenue water (NRW) would be reduced and everybody would gain.  
If there is to be a solution to the challenge TPJ needs to work more imaginatively with 
the government of DKI Jakarta and pay closer attention on the City’s socioeconomic 
and  demographic squatter problem.   
For the system to work the law must be enforced and appropriate conditions taken into 
account.  It was to accomplish this that Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body 
(JWSRB) as an independent regulatory body was established.  However, the fixation 
on meeting targets seems to preclude a more imaginative approach.  When either 
Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) as the private sector agent or PAM Jaya cannot fulfil their 
targets this becomes an all absorbing issue.  As JWSRB has very limited powers and is 
unable to impose new directions, sanctions or penalties.  This regulatory body can 
neither determine water price increases for those who are able to pay nor reduce the 
charges for those who cannot. JWSRB is unable to maintain a balance between the 
interests of the public and the public sector because decision is held by the Governor 
of DKI Jakarta.  Thus, there is a need to review and enhance the role and 
responsibilities of JWSRB by providing stronger both legal and enforcement support for 
its work.   
5.2 Interview with the Government Institutions  
Two Government Institutions were interviewed, namely the Department of Public 
Works and the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS).  When the 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) process was first set up, the Ministry of Public Works 
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was involved in coordinating and advising on some technical constraints.  However, 
after the PPP was established, which is when Jakarta Waterworks with Thames PAM 
Jaya (TPJ) took over the development and investment, operation and maintenance of 
the Eastern Jakarta drinking water system.  Public Works involvement was 
henceforward limited to monitoring and evaluating overall cooperation and 
performance.  The Department of Public Works in the Directorate General of Human 
Settlement was involved in setting up Technical Guidelines and Implementation 
Guidelines for drinking water and raw water, along with wastewater and solid waste 
management.   
The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), on the other hand, was 
involved in the formulation of policies on how to set up transparent and competitive 
private investment procedures, protection of public and private rights, and how private 
sector involvement should be managed. This involved preparing an integrated 
framework for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) concerning drinking water supply and 
a pathway the private sector would be obliged to follow if they wished to become 
involved in running the Jakarta water supply system. 
In the interviews, the government representatives agreed that there were weaknesses 
in the Public Private Partnership (PPP) process which established Jakarta Drinking 
Water Service.  Owing to the interest taken by President Suharto a proper competitive 
bidding process was not followed and Thames Water International (TWI) was given a 
contract under favourable terms.  This meant that the PPP process took into 
consideration neither the competences of the private sector and the ability of the 
bidding parties to deliver a better service, nor tested the capacity of local government 
to manage an open and transparent bidding process. 
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5.3 Interview with PAM Jaya 
From 1922 until early 1998, well before the establishment of the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) arrangement, PAM Jaya was the only operator responsible for:  
• running and improving the Jakarta water supply;   
• distributing water of a quality that met appropriate health standards; and  
• providing a service that was supposed to serve all the Capital City’s residents.   
As was shown in the previous chapter, PAM Jaya was able to increase the capacity of 
water production and the extent of service coverage (Figures 4.1 and 4.2).  However, 
despite all of these improvements, PAM Jaya could not keep up with the rapid growth 
of population.  PAM Jaya needed more investment, better quality human resources and 
advanced technology to improve its service.  This is why PAM Jaya agreed to adopt 
Public Private Partnership (PPP), with Thames Water International (TWI) as a partner 
in the management of the Eastern Jakarta water service. 
After the establishment of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) PAM Jaya’s 
responsibilities became limited to monitoring the performance of the private partner as 
stated in the Governor’s Letter of Intent Number 25 of the year 2003 regarding PAM 
Jaya organizational structure and frameworks.  Several issues were raised during the 
interview: 
• After ten years of its involvement in Jakarta water supply, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) 
is still unable to achieve both the technical and service standards agreed in the 
contract.  High Non Revenue Water (NRW), low water volume sold, limited 
coverage area, plus a high level of consumer dissatisfaction shows that TPJ work is 
not working at an optimal level (Figures 4.3 to 4.7).   
• Despite all these failures, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has improved its service 
through a 24 hour call center, opened their bill counter on Saturday to serve 
customers, and also undertaken rehabilitation work and expanded distribution. 
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• As pointed out by Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) and others, the 
biggest challenge facing TPJ is to reduce non revenue water (NRW) due to leakage 
in the distribution mains and illegal connections.  Currently investment is focused 
on reducing NRW, through replacing distribution pipes rehabilitated old pipes, 
cutting off illegal connections and controlling delivery to consumers using terra 
meters4, and replacing old and installing new water meters. 
• As for PAM Jaya, it sees its biggest challenge to fulfilling its role as getting full 
access to Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) performance data.  PAM Jaya feels that the 
Procedure on Performance Supervision and Evaluation System (PPSES), a format 
used and applied to assess private sector performance, needs to be refined 
because the reported data provided by both TPJ and other private sector 
companies is only of very limited use in carrying out proper evaluations. 
• Due to ambiguity in the Cooperation Agreement and weak law enforcement, PAM 
Jaya, whose responsibility it is to monitor private sector performance, has been 
able to neither enforce sanctions nor impose penalties against private sector 
companies. As a consequence this has enabled companies to ignore targets 
agreed to in the contracts. 
5.4 Interview with Thames PAM Jaya 
In my discussions with the representatives of Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), the following 
problems were presented as principal matters of concern, they included:  
• the quality of raw water;  
• disturbances in the water treatment process;  
• the condition of the distribution network they inherited; and  
• poor piped water quality.   
                                                 
 
4
 Tera meter is an instrument used to calibrate water meters. 
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Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) is very dependant on Jatiluhur Dam for its raw water.  The 
Dam diverts water which flows through the Tarum Barat Canal.  The discharge of 
domestic and industrial waste into the canal adversely affects raw water quality and 
results in a high level of pollution.  This makes it more difficult to treat the water and 
bring it up to a good potable level.  Operational costs have been greatly increased as a 
consequence of this situation and TPJ often have to buy raw water from other sources 
which again increases the price of treated water delivered to clients.   
Disturbances to the treatment process also reduce water production.  Such 
disturbances include problems in the supply of electricity, maintenance of the water 
treatment plant and weather conditions.  High rainfall during the Monsoon results in a 
decline in the quality of raw water quality due to run off over contaminated ground.  The 
poor condition of the catchment in upstream areas causes high turbidity in raw water.  
The water treatment facilities themselves also frequently get flooded during the rainy 
season and have to shut down for extended periods.  All of these involve costs that 
have to be handed on to clients.  During the dry season, raw water supply from the 
Jatiluhur Dam declines resulting in water shortages.  Both wet and dry conditions 
impact on production making it difficult to meet demand. 
Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) believe that they well on their way to fulfilling their ambitious 
target set in 1997 of providing clean potable water to most of Eastern Jakarta by the 
end of 2007.  They say they are able to produce drinking water to the standard set in 
PERMENKES No. 416/Menkes/Per/IX/1990.  However, due to water contamination 
caused by leaks it appears unlikely that they will be able to reach this target.  Just to 
prevent bacterial contamination TPJ is adding more chlorine to the water than clients 
like and this itself becomes a contaminant. 
The sale of Thames PAM Jaya’s (TPJ) shares as part of a take over bid was also 
raised in the interview.  TPJ representatives claimed that selling shares is a very 
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common business practice and it was a clear statement that the management needs 
additional investment capital and access to expertise.  TPJ has sold out to Aquatico 
and Alberta.  The transfer of ownership will not affect the contract.  In fact there will be 
no renegotiation of the Contract until 2022, when it comes to an end.  Despite the 
change in ownership TPJ is still involved in the operation of the Jakarta water service, 
though the name has been changed to Aetra.  
5.5 Interview with the World Bank 
According to the World Bank representative, the Bank was not involved in the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) negotiation process.  In the early days before President 
Suharto’s family became involved the World Bank was willing to participate.  They 
decided to step back from the entire process when President Suharto himself 
appointed the private sector contractor.  However, the bank continued to be involved in 
several other private water sector projects in Indonesia which commenced about the 
same time. The Bank was also involved in the negotiation and establishment of the 
new Water Resources Law which made possible private sector engagement in the 
water sector. 
World Bank specialists identified three factors which to them explain why Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) in Jakarta Waterworks, have not done as well as expected.   
1. There was very little political support from the Government of Indonesia.  
Furthermore, being very new to the system with no experience in PPP, local 
governments were not prepared to work with their business partner in a way that 
would have been expected of a more experienced partner.   
2. During the early days of PPP, there was no regulation to protect the needs of both 
consumers and the private sector in such joint management arrangements.   
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3. There was little or no awareness that financial and managerial responsibility was no 
longer held by the government, and that this had been transferred to the private 
sector. 
5.6 Interview with the NGOs (WALHI, FORKAMI and KruHA) 
Three local Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were interviewed: Friends of the 
Earth Indonesia (WALHI), Indonesia Drinking Water Quality Communication Forum 
(FORKAMI) and the People’s Coalition for the Right to Water (KruHA). 
The Friends of the Earth Indonesia (WALHI) was established in 1980 in response to 
environmental problems and insecurity of natural resource management as a result of 
unsustainable development processes.  WALHI’s involvement in the water sector 
focuses mainly on the issues of water provision, authorization, liberalization and 
commercialization of water.   
The Indonesia Drinking Water Quality Communication Forum (FORKAMI) is a new 
organization formed in 2000.  Its mission is to create a platform for information 
exchange, mediate and advise different stakeholders on water quality management.  
Starting in 2002, FORKAMI, working together with Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory 
Body (JWSRB) has conducted several customer satisfaction surveys in Jakarta. 
KruHA was established as a civil society group in 2002 in response to a World Bank 
loan in the water resource sector which laid down new conditions under which 
investment would be made available.  The loan, Water Resources Sector Structural 
Adjustment Loan (WATSAL), was approved by Government of Indonesia in 1999, and 
promised a US$300 million investment package aimed at restructuring the water 
resource sector in Indonesia.  KruHA’s mission remains the fight for a people based 
water resource management system run by users and the government in a way that is 
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consistent with the state constitution.  They entirely reject the rationale for private 
sector involvement in water resource management.  
FORKAMI, WALHI and KruHA represent the voice of the public, those who are against 
private sector involvement.  They share the view that water is a public good and access 
to water is a human right.  For them water cannot be treated like a commodity of 
principally economic significance.  They believe that private sector involvement will in 
the end inflict a heavy burden on people, especially to the poor.  They see private profit 
and full cost recovery as blight on society and that meeting people’s basic needs, such 
as water, is the responsibility of the state.  Treating water as an economic good and 
transferring ownership and management from the state to the private sector is seen to 
be a challenge that threatens the social contract between the state and its people. 
In the case of the Jakarta water supply, the three Non Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) named here agree that it was only international pressure to open up utilities 
like water for private sector involvement; the people of Indonesia did not want it and 
were never asked.  The government decision to push ahead with Public Private 
Participation (PPP) was rushed and did not go through a proper public consultation 
process.  Representatives of the public and NGOs were not actively involved in the 
process.  Public consultation was just a formality to which representative NGOs were 
invited, but were never invited to formulate a considered response and hence were 
never really involved in the process. 
Initiatives taken to attract the private sector were also motivated by the wish to meet 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target 10 which is to halve the number of 
people currently without access to clean water by 2015.  To reach this target, a huge 
amount of investment is needed.  The government’s financing capacity for water supply 
is only Rp. 400 billion (US$ 40 million) per year which leaves gap amounting to Rp. 17 
trillion (US$ 1.7 billion) which is likely to rise to 40 trillion (US$ 4 billion) by 2015.  This 
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is one of the principal reasons why Government of Indonesia decided to invite private 
sector investment and management of the nation’s water supply. 
However, as overseas experience shows, private sector investment is not a magic 
bullet that can overcome all problems in water supply provision.  Jakarta is one 
example of how difficult it is.  After ten years Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has been unable 
to make a significant improvement in the service.  Above all the governments’ limited 
experience in public private partnership and weak law enforcement has made it difficult 
for the company to solve the many endemic problems presented by Jakarta. 
5.7 Interview with Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) Consumers 
Interviews with people in the communities were carried out in three of the Thames PAM 
Jaya (TPJ) service areas, namely Cipinang Cempedak, Koja Selatan and Tanjung 
Priok.  Sixty respondents were selected by a random sampling method to participate in 
interviews.  Although interviews were conducted on the weekends when I expected to 
find everybody home, 60 percent of respondents were women who described 
themselves mainly as housewives.  All respondents were aware that Thames PAM 
Jaya (TPJ) rather than PAM Jaya runs the Jakarta water system.  However, according 
to other studies, even up to 2003, and then largely owing to the lack of public 
consultation during the PPP process, many residents were not aware of private sector 
involvement. 
5.7.1 Cipinang Cempedak 
Cipinang Cempedak is known as an old area, located on the eastern part of Jakarta.  
The majority of residents are pensioners, who have lived there since the 1950s.    From 
the size and look of the houses, most respondents can be said to belong to upper and 
middle class socioeconomic groups however I found several households that came 
from a less privileged group.  Although the vast majority of residents were connected to 
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the Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) water service, due to high cost many of them do not use 
the service regularly.  They only pay the monthly connection fee and use the water 
from the service only as an alternative source in the case of drought.   
Groundwater is still the first choice for the majority of residents.  This is not only 
because groundwater costs less, but also because it has a better taste and is of 
superior quality to PAM water.  Water supplied by Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) has strong 
chlorine odor.  Although residents were aware of the fact that Jakarta’s groundwater 
contains Iron (Fe) concentrations over the standard drinking water quality which is a 
health risk, this does not stop people from using it.  Several households at risk prefer a 
commercial water brand, such as Aqua (from Danone).   
Figure 5.1 Cipinang Cempedak Residential Area, Eastern Jakarta 
 
The average household is home to five people with a household income ranging from 
Rp.1.000.000,00 to Rp.2.500.000,00  (US$100 to US$250) per annum.  The average 
cost of water is estimated at around Rp. 200.000,00 (US$20) per household.  This 
means residents have to spend more than 4 percent of their income for household 
water consumption (standard according to the Government Regulation Number 16 of 
2005 concerning Development of Drinking Water Supply System).  The majority of 
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residents complained that since the City’s waterworks fell under the management of 
private companies, water has become too expensive.  The residents of Cipinang 
Cempedak hope for a better service because there has not been any significant 
improvement following the imposition of an increase in the water tariff.   
5.7.2 Koja Selatan 
Koja Selatan is located on the sea side area of the northern part of Jakarta.  
Groundwater quality in this area is brackish, and unsuitable for consumption.  The 
majority of residents are TPJ customers.  The area has been given special attention by 
the TPJ project.  Water in this area runs for 24 hours but the volume declines during 
the day due to intense activities that are water dependent.  The respondents 
interviewed were mainly from the lower socio-economy group, with incomes ranging 
from Rp. 700,000.00 (US$70) to Rp. 1,500,000.00 (US$150) per household per month 
(6 people per household).  The majority of them own small businesses like warung 
(small shops) or rented rooms.  Most of the residents spend between Rp. 150,000.00 
(US$15) to Rp. 300,000.00 (US$30) on clean water for drinking, cooking and bathing. 
Similar to the residents of Cipinang Cempedak, the residents find the water tariff is 
becoming too expensive.  Residents are not informed in advance of tariff adjustments. 
and since they have no alternative have to just put up with what is imposed.    
5.7.3 Tanjung Priok 
The people of Tanjung Priok district like the residents of Koja Selatan have a 
groundwater problem.  Therefore, the majority of residents are TPJ customers.  
However, some residents rely on water vendors.  This is mainly because they cannot 
afford the cost of installing pipe connections to the City’s Waterworks.  Water does not 
run for 24 hours, and mostly there is no water during the day.  The majority of residents 
interviewed complained about the poor water pressure.  Some of the residents still use 
groundwater for washing and bathing, even though the water is unsuitable for domestic 
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use.  This presents an endemic risk to good health but enables the residents to keep 
water supply costs as low as possible.   
  Figure 5.2 Water Vendor refilling Jerry Cans Figure 5.3 Tanjung Priok residential area 
 
 
 
Like respondents from other locations, the water tariff is considered to be too 
expensive and increased charges have not been followed by a significant improvement 
in the service.  People’s incomes range from Rp. 600,000.00 (US$60) to Rp. 
1,000,000.00 (US$100) per annum with 6 people on average per household.  Their 
monthly spending for water is estimated at around Rp. 70,000.00 (US$7) to Rp. 
80,000.00 (US$8).  Many of them can only afford education for their children up to 
junior high school. 
5.8 Problems in Jakarta Water Provision 
This section discusses and analyses problems which occur in Jakarta water provision 
based on the interviews with different stakeholders.  Some of the problems identified 
include water quality, quantity, continuity and water pressure; water tariff; weak law 
enforcement; environmental and technical issues. 
5.8.1 Water Quality, Continuity and Water Pressure 
A survey done by the Regulatory Body in 2005 shows a downgrading of customer 
satisfaction.  Some of the factors affecting this are poor water quality, continuity and 
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water pressure.  Water quality supplied by Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) does not comply 
with the drinking water standard.  Consumers still have to boil the water before they 
consume it.  This means consumers have to pay more money paying for either gas or 
electricity to boil the water.  Many people interviewed drink bottled water. 
Water flowing through household connections is mostly available for 24 hours.  
However, water pressure drops at sometime every day, mostly during daylight hours.  
The supply is more reliable during the night and mornings.   
In areas far from the water treatment plant, water pressure is very low.  This is why 
many customers in Tanjung Priok complained about water that could not run up to the 
second floor.  In areas close to the water treatment plant, the problem is reversed, 
water pressure is so high that taps and pipes can be broken. 
5.8.2 Water Tariff 
Water tariff should be determined by the cost to produce the water, deliver it to clients 
and the clients’ ability to pay. Customer willingness to pay however is different from 
affordability.  Customer willingness to pay can be measured by finding out how 
dependent customers are on the water service.  When customers have other water 
sources available with better quality and a lower price, they may not be willing to pay 
for the water delivered by the water company.  From interviews with customers it is 
clear that the quality of water received greatly affects their willingness to pay.  The 
majority stated that they are willing to pay for water even though the tariff continues to 
increase.  However, they stated that it is only fair increases must be followed or 
justified by improvement of water quality.   
Customer affordability is measured by identifying the following indicators for each 
socioeconomic class of household: average of customer expenditure on water, volume 
of water used and monthly income.  Affordability seems to be a central problem in 
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private sector involvement whose interest is profit oriented.  A survey done by the 
Regulatory Body in 2006 shows that clients spend up to seven percent of their income 
on water which is well above the 4 percent guideline laid down by the government 5.  
For many residents this means they have to cut their spending on other important 
matters, such as education. 
Jakarta water tariff is known to be the highest in Southeast Asia.  The average water 
price in Jakarta is now US$0.7 per cubic meter (m3).  This is higher than the average 
water price in Singapore, US$0.55 per cubic meter; the Philippines, US$0.35 per cubic 
meter; Malaysia, US$0.22 per cubic meter; and Thailand, US$0.29 per cubic meter 
(Kompas, Thursday, 26 June 2008). The high water price is justified by the companies 
involved on the grounds of needing to meet high operational and maintenance costs, 
such as fixing existing pipes and installing new ones.   
Operational costs generally include technical expenses (such as electricity and 
chemical stock) and administrative costs (such as office and staff salaries).  In the case 
of private sector involvement in the Jakarta water supply, however, operational costs 
include several extra expenditure items that did not exist under PAM Jaya 
management, namely leasing two separate buildings in two different business areas of 
Jakarta instead of using the existing buildings owned by PAM Jaya.  The salaries of 
foreign executives, which are ten times higher than the salary of PAM Jaya executives, 
high security costs and procurement of new office equipment, computers and 
operational vehicles also add to the cost of running the enterprise.  Just imagine, 
residents of Jakarta have to bear the burden of paying the salary of foreign executives 
and the support facilities they require just to get the water which they are entitled to, 
according to the National Constitution. 
                                                 
 
5
 Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Regulation Number 23 of 2006 
concerning the Technical Guidance and PDAM Drinking Water Tariff Control 
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5.8.3 Environment 
One of the benefits expected from the improvement of Jakarta piped water supply is 
the conservation of groundwater to prevent land subsidence which has been occurring 
at a rate of 2.8 cm per year (Lanti, 2006).  Despite all of the improvements made by 
Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), such as expanding service coverage and increasing 
connections, they have not been able to reduce people’s use of groundwater.  People 
prefer to use groundwater because its quality is good and it costs nothing:  a difficult 
combination to beat. 
The use of wells however is mainly restricted to households that have access to good 
quality groundwater.  Depending on their income these households usually have simple 
shallow wells or wells that are equipped with modern pumps.   
Excessive use of groundwater pumping causes saltwater intrusion.  This is already a 
problem in areas of North Jakarta.  Land subsidence is making a large part of the 
capital prone to flooding.  The Government has recognized this issue, but because for 
some the use of the ground water is their only source of drinking water it is difficult for 
the government to do anything about it. 
5.8.4 Weak Law Enforcement 
As has been mentioned several times a system of penalties for the failure to meet 
targets is included in the Cooperation Agreement (2001).  This was included to 
motivate the private sector to meet their commitments.  In reality however, despite the 
failure to meet targets, in some cases on numerous occasions, no fines have ever 
been successfully levied.   
PAM Jaya has not been able to enforce penalty claims because of ambiguities in the 
contract and weak enforcement.  PAM Jaya has been reluctant to pursue claims for 
fines in the courts and has restricted itself to an exchange of letters, to avoid the 
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concessionaires bringing a case against PAM Jaya for failure to also meet some of its 
contractual commitments.  Weak enforcement of penalties reduces the strength of 
incentives resulting in the long run in poor performance outcomes. 
Even though Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) performance, as shown in the previous chapter 
is far from satisfactory, according to JWSRB (2007) the Cooperation Agreement has 
locked the Government of Indonesia into a long term partnership.  To end the 
partnership now would be costly.  If the government decides to terminate the 
agreement, the Jakarta Government is obliged to pay Rp. 536 billion6 for breaches of 
contract.  If the operators themselves terminate the agreement owing to non 
compliance on the government side, the Jakarta Provincial Government must pay Rp. 
2.54 trillion in fines.  To buy back the Jakarta water service, would cost the Jakarta 
Provincial Government Rp. 4.54 trillion.  It is not difficult to see why JWSRB feels there 
is a need to amend the Agreement of Cooperation 
5.9 Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP in Jakarta Water Supply 
5.9.1 Advantages of PPP in Jakarta Waterworks 
Thames PAM Jaya has been able to increase its coverage ratio from fifty seven 
percent in 1998 to sixty seven percent in 2007.  Although this is a relatively small 
improvement of only ten percent, the increased coverage ratio means more people 
have access to piped water at their homes. People do not have to walk long distances 
to fetch water so they save time.  Instead, they can use their time to get a better 
education and do extra work to improve their financial situation.  It also needs to be 
pointed out that they no longer have to buy expensive water from vendors.  However, 
these advantages can only be felt by a very small number of residents in Jakarta, who 
can afford the service. 
                                                 
 
6
 Currency equivalent (as of November 2007) US$1 = Rupiah 9,876 
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5.9.2 Disadvantages of PPP in Jakarta Waterworks 
Private sector main interest in PPP is profit centered.  This encourages the private 
sector to focus on the needs of households that can afford to pay for water.  This 
results in an unequal distribution of water supply systems and the delivery of water. 
The poor are left to rely on the service provided by small water vendors which are 
unregistered individual small scale private enterprises who charge a much higher price 
for water than that charged by the big companies.  This is due to the absence of 
standard water price which give the freedom to the private sector to determine the 
water price. 
Continuing tariff increases due to the increasing costs of producing and delivering 
water is another major disadvantage.  Water becomes expensive.  According to the 
clause in the Ministerial Decree Number 23 of Year 2006, the drinking water tariff shall 
not exceed 4 percent of the customer’s income, which is considered as an acceptable 
level of affordability.  Since PPP was introduced, however, the price of water in Jakarta 
has continued to increase.  As the result, a survey carried out by the Regulatory Body 
(2006) shows the majority of Jakarta residents have to spend more than four percent of 
their income on water.  This may show that customers’ level of affordability is higher 
than the standard, but many customers complained about the poor service by TPJ that 
does not balance the price they have to pay for water.   
Very little involvement of the government in the current PPP can disadvantageously 
affect the performance of the future operator of Jakarta drinking water supply after the 
contract with current private sector is over.  According to the Cooperation Agreement 
(2001) the operation and maintenance of the drinking water system will be given back 
to PAM Jaya after the concession contract is over.   
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Chapter Six – Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
The aim to this research was to evaluate the impact of public private partnership in 
Jakarta’s drinking water service and its impact on the City’s residents, ten years into 
the twenty five year contract.  The results of the research lead to a number of 
disturbing conclusions 
• Ten years of private sector involvement in Eastern Jakarta Water Supply Provision 
has not brought any significant improvement in the water service.  This is especially 
evident in the high volume of water lost as non revenue water (NRW) and poor 
water quality and pressure. 
• Lack of transparency and public tendering in the process of forming the public 
private partnership may have contributed to this poor performance because the 
proper search for a competent partner was short circuited.  Political interference in 
the bidding process is a form of corruption in which the company granted the 
contract was clearly complicit.   
• High Non Revenue Water continues to make up 52 percent of total production.  
This is mainly due to hostile attitudes towards the managers of the service built up 
around the sense of unequal access to water especially on the part of the poor.  
People excluded from legal access by the high cost of water believe they have no 
other way of getting what they need and feel justified in hacking into the reticulation 
system. Thames PAM Jaya like other private enterprises is profit oriented and 
therefore, focuses exclusively on customers who are able to pay for connections 
but by excluding the poor create trouble for themselves.   
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• The water tariff in Jakarta is not only the highest in Indonesia.   It is also the highest 
in the Southeast Asia region.  If the service provided justified the charges this would 
perhaps be acceptable but as it is the service delivered is still of poor quality. 
• The Agreement of Cooperation has locked the Government of Indonesia into a long 
term partnership. Despite Thames PAM Jaya’s poor performance, the government 
cannot take any action to end the partnership because it would be charged with 
extremely high costs relating to breach of contract.  
• Limited access to water due to its high price and low service has resulted in the on-
going use of groundwater.  Excessive use of groundwater is leading to saltwater 
intrusion and land subsidence.  This is already a serious problem in North Jakarta 
and elsewhere the deterioration of groundwater has resulted in considerable health 
risks. 
6.2 Recommendations 
According to my analysis, after ten years of PPP running the Jakarta water supply 
serious adjustments need to be made. The following recommendations would make a 
difference to future implementation and the running of the public private partnership: 
• Amendments need to be made to the existing Cooperation Agreement which would 
enable the Government of DKI Jakarta to take a firm stand regarding the poor 
performance of Thames PAM Jaya.   
• A standard model of Cooperation Agreement in water provision should be 
established.  Negotiation guidelines and due diligence standards need to be 
prepared and put in place by the central government.   
• If PPP is to continue as the principal mode of running the water system the 
government needs to build the capacity of the regional authorities so that they can 
competently and confidently play their part in keeping the concession companies in 
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line.  In the meantime the central government needs to provide them with qualified 
consultants to help them do their job.  
• Water and water services should be provided at a fair, appropriate and affordable 
price.  At the moment and over the years the service has been provided under a 
public private partnership clients have been overcharged for the quality of the 
service delivered. 
• Any improvement made in the water service should give full consideration to the 
poor.  This does not mean that an appropriately clean water service should be 
provided free of charge but that cross subsidisation from rich to poor should be 
arranged and set up a low charge out rate that would stop or reduce the 
considerable damage done by those hacking into the system.  
• Any improvement made to the  water service should not only be made to achieve 
targets, such as those specified  in both the Cooperation Agreement and as 
Millennium Development Goals:  the most important challenge is to provide enough 
water of sufficient quality to meet the basic needs of the people in the region. 
• Customer rights should be included in any future Agreement of Cooperation and 
these should be supported by national and trans-national regulations.  These rights 
should be properly publicised so customers understand what their rights are and be 
able to take legal action against private enterprises that take advantage of them.  
Water is a basic need.  Many customers interviewed were unsatisfied with the 
service provided by Thames PAM Jaya, but believed they could not do anything 
about it.   
• Private sector involvement should be the last alternative to improve the 
management of the water supply service in Indonesia.  What the Government of 
Indonesia should do is find ways to improve the performance of local water 
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providers such as PAM Jaya.  As stated in the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia Regulation Number 16 of 2005 concerning Development of the Drinking 
Water Supply System, it is the local government’s responsibility to provide drinking 
water of sufficient quality and quantity to its residents. 
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Appendix A: The Structure of Water Tariff 
Below is the structure of water tariff adjusted for DKI Jakarta 2007, in accordance to 
Governor of DKI Jakarta Regulation No. 11 of 2007. 
Appendix A1: Water Tariff based on Consumer Classification and Consumption 
Consumption Block and Water Tariff per m3 
0 - 10 m3 11 – 20 m3 >20 m3 No. Consumer Group 
Rp. Rp. Rp. 
1. Group I 1 050 1 050 1 050 
2. Group II 1 050 1 050 1 575 
3. Group IIIA 3 550 4 700 5 500 
4. Group IIIB 4 900 6 000 7 450 
5. Group IVA 6 825 8 150 9 800 
6. Group IVB 12 550 12 550 12 550 
7. Group V/Special 14 650 14 650 14 650 
Appendix A2: Water Meter Maintenance Charge 
No. Diameter of Water Meter (inch) 
Group I and II 
(Rp) 
Group IIIA  
(Rp) 
Group IIIB 
(Rp) 
Group IVA, IVB & V 
(Rp) 
1. 0.50 3 400 3 800 4 400 5 200 
2. 0.75 6 500 7 000 8 000 9 000 
3. 1.00 8 000 9 000 10 000 11 000 
4. 1.25 12 000 14 000 16 000 17 000 
5. 1.50 15 000 18 000 21 000  22 000 
6. 2.00 28 000 35 000 40 500 43 000 
7. 2.50 29 000 36 000 42 000 44 000 
8. 3.00 36 000 45 000 52 000 55 000 
9. 4.00 50 000 60 000 72 000 78 000 
10. 5.00 51 000 62 000 74 000 80 000 
11. 6.00 60 000 76 000 86 000  92 000 
12. 8.00 90 000 112 000 135 000 142 000 
13. 10.00 230 000 286 000 345 000 363 000 
14. 12.00 299 000 372 000 449 000 472 000 
15. 14.00 402 000 500 000 604 000 635 000 
16. 16.00 496 000 617 000 746 000 784 000 
Appendix A3: Fixed Water Meter Charge 
No. Diameter of Water Meter (inch) Group I Group II Group IIIA Group IIIB 
Group IVA 
and IVB Group V 
1. 0.50 1 295 1 660 6 640 7 550 14 190 22 465 
2. 0.75 2 160 2 790 11 110 12 630 23 755 37 590 
3. 1.00 4 315 5 565 22 220 25 265 47 510 75 180 
4. 1.25 4 745 6 115 24 420 27 770 52 215 82 620 
5. 1.50 5 165 6 670 26 630 30 285 56 920 90 065 
6. 2.00 8 195 10 565 42 215 48 000 90 245 142 775 
7. 2.50 13 800 17 795 71 100 80 850 152 010 240 510 
8. 3.00 18 115 23 360 93 325 106 115 199 520 315 680 
9. 4.00 31 920 41 165 164 445 186 985 351 570 556 275 
10. 5.00 49 600 63 970 255 560 290 595 546 390 864 515 
11. 6.00 72 035 92 905 371 140 422 020 793 475 1 255 475 
12. 8.00 127 245 164 120 655 605 745 485 1 401 655 2 217 755 
13. 10.00 199 280 257 025 1 026 755 1 167 510 2 195 130 3 473 230 
14. 12.00 286 840 369 960 1 477 900 1 680 505 3 159 665 4 999 345 
15. 14.00 390 795 504 025 2 013 500 2 289 530 4 304 750 6 811 135 
16. 16.00 510 275 658 125 2 629 110 2 989 535 5 620 875 8 893 570 
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Appendix A4: Extra Administration Cost 
Administration Activity Cost (Rp) 
Ownership reversion cost 22 500 
Meter sealing cost 10 000 
Meter calibration cost 
• diameter 0.5-1.5 inch 
• diameter 2-4 inch 
• diameter 6-16 inch 
 
40 000 
130 000 
800 000 
Replacement the lost of meter card 10 000 
Customer Deposit of Guarantee 
Group I 
Group II 
Group IIIA 
Group IIIB 
Group IVA 
Group IVB 
Group V/Special 
 
35 000 
35 000 
55 000 
55 000 
260 000 
260 000 
260 000 
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Appendix B: Drinking Water and Clean Water Standard 
 
MAXIMUM CONCENTRATION/LEVEL ALLOWED PARAMETER UNIT Drinking Water Standard* Clean Water Standard** 
A. Physic: 
   
1.  Odour - No Odour No Odour 
2.  Total Dissolved Solid mg/l 1,000 1,500 
3.  Turbidity NTU scale 5 25 
4.  Taste - No Taste No Taste 
5.  Temperature oC Air temperature + 3 oC Air temperature + 3 oC 
6.  Colour TCU scale 15 50 
B.  Chemical: 
   
a.  Inorganic    
1.  Mercury mg/l 0.001 0.001 
2.  Aluminium mg/l 0.2 - 
3.  Arsenic mg/l 0.05 0.05 
4.  Barium mg/l 1.0 - 
5.  Iron mg/l 0.3 1.0 
6.  Fluoride mg/l 1.5 1.5 
7.  Cadmium mg/l 0.005 0.005 
8.  Hardness (CaCO3) mg/l 500 500 
9.  Chloride mg/l 250 600 
10. Cr +6 mg/l 0.05 0.05 
11. Manganese mg/l 0.1 0.5 
12. Sodium mg/l 200 - 
13. Nitrate, as N mg/l 10 10 
14. Nitrite, as N mg/l 1.0 1.0 
15. Argentums mg/l 0.05 - 
16. pH mg/l 6.5 – 8.5 6.5 – 9.0 
17. Selenium mg/l 0.01 0.01 
18. Zinc mg/l 5.0 15 
19. Cyanide mg/l 0.1 0.1 
20. Sulphate mg/l 400 400 
21. Sulphide mg/l 0.05 - 
22. Copper mg/l 1.0 - 
23. Lead mg/l 0.05 0.05 
b.  Organic 
   
1.  Aldrin and Dieldrin mg/l 0.0007 0.0007 
2.  Benzene mg/l 0.01 0.01 
3.  Benzo (a) pyrene mg/l 0.00001 0.0007 
4.  Chloradane (total insomer) mg/l 0.0003 0.007 
5.  Chloroform mg/l 0.03 0.03 
6.  2.4 D mg/l 0.10 0.1 
7.  DDT mg/l 0.03 0.03 
8.  Detergent mg/l 0.05 0.05 
9.  1.2-Dikloretan mg/l 0.01 0.01 
10. 1.1 Di-chloro-ethane mg/l 0.0003 0.0003 
11. Heptachlor and 
Hepachlorepoxide mg/l 0.003 0.003 
12. Heksachlorobenzene mg/l 0.00001 0.00001 
13. Gamma-HCH mg/l 0.004 0.004 
14. Metoxiklor mg/l 0.03 0.10 
15. Pentachlorophenol mg/l 0.01 0.01 
16. Pesticide total mg/l 0.10 0.10 
17. 2,4,6-trichlorophenol mg/l 0.01 - 
18. Organic Compound (KMnO4) mg/l 10 - 
* PERMENKES No. 416/Men Kes/Per/IX/1990 Regarding Standard Quality of Drinking Water. 
** PERMENKES No. 416/Men Kes/Per/IX/1990 Regarding Standard Quality of Clean Water. 
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Appendix C: Interviews and Meetings 
 
 
 
 
Date Institutions Address 
15 July 2007 The Regulatory Body (BRPAM) 
 
Jalan Pejompongan Raya No. 57  
Jakarta Pusat 10210 INDONESIA 
Tel. +62 21 5704264 
 
18 July 2007 The Regulatory Body (BRPAM) 
 
Jalan Pejompongan Raya No. 57  
Jakarta Pusat 10210 INDONESIA 
Tel. +62 21 570 9732 
 
18 July 2007 The Regulatory Body (BRPAM) 
 
Jalan Pejompongan Raya No. 57  
Jakarta Pusat 10210 INDONESIA 
Tel. +62 21 570 9732 
 
25 July 2007 Indonesian Drinking Water 
Communication Forum 
(FORKAMI) 
 
Graha Fortuna Indotama  
Perkantoran Pulo Mas 1 Gd. 3 Lt. 3 
26 July 2007 The World Bank 
 
Jakarta Stock Exchange, Tower II, 
12th Fl. Jalan Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-
53 
Jakarta INDONESIA 
Ph. +62 21 52993047 
 
27 July 2007 Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) 
 
Sampoerna Strategc Square. 
Tower B, Lt. 29 
Jalan Jendral Sudirman Kav. 45-46 
Jakarta INDONESIA 
 
3 August 2007 People’s Coalition for the Right to 
Water (KRuHA) 
 
Jalan Mampang Prapatan XI/23 
Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA 
Ph. + 62 21 79196721 
 
9 August 2007 Jakarta Municipal Waterworks 
(PAM Jaya) 
 
Jalan Penjernihan II Pejompongan  
Jakarta INDONESIA 
+62 21 570 4250 
 
10 August 2007 Department of Public Works, 
Directorate of Drinking Water 
Development  
 
Jalan Patimura No. 20 
Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA 
 
11 August 2007 National Development Planning 
Agency (BAPPENAS) 
Jalan Taman Surapati No. 2 
Jakarta 10310 INDONESIA 
 
12 August 2007 Jakarta Municipal Waterworks 
(PAM Jaya) 
 
Jalan Penjernihan II Pejompongan  
Jakarta INDONESIA 
+62 21 570 4250 
 
15 August 2007 Walhi 
 
Jalan Tegal Parang Utara No 14 
Jakarta Selatan INDONESIA 
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Appendix D: Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire for Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 
1. Can you go back and tell a little bit about the history of public private partnership in 
Jakarta water supply?  
2. What is the role of JWSRB in Jakarta water supply? 
3. As an independent body, how does JWSRB role differ from PAM Jaya? 
4. One of JWSRB missions is to protect consumer’s satisfaction.  How do you 
measure this? 
5. Who is responsible in monitoring the private operator to fulfill their obligations? 
6. What are the consequences if operator could not fulfill the obligations? 
7. What is JWSRB role in tariff control? 
8. Is there any regulatory protection for consumers due to the implementation of 
market pricing? 
9. What do you think of Thames PAM Jaya’s performance? 
10. What was the initial policy concerning regulation of private company?  
Questionnaire for the Government (BAPPENAS and Department of Public Works) 
1. What is the role of your Institution in Jakarta water public private partnership? 
2. Why did the Government have to ask the private sector to be involved in the city’s 
water provision in the form of PSP?   
3. How was PAM Jaya performance before privatization?  
4. What do you think of Thames PAM Jaya’s performance now?   
5. In your opinion, what are the main constraints faced by TPJ in its operation in 
Jakarta? 
6. In your opinion, if the Government had not involved the private sector, would PAM 
Jaya able to improve its service? 
7. There had been strong opposition to water privatization from the public and NGOs.  
What do you think about this? 
Questionnaire for PAM Jaya 
1. Can you explain a little bit about the history of Jakarta water supply before the 
public private partnership, along with PAM Jaya achievements? 
2. How was the process of public private partnership in Jakarta Waterworks? 
3. How does PAM Jaya monitor TPJ performance? 
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4. What do you think of TPJ performance, ten years into the contract? 
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of PPP in Jakarta Waterworks? 
6. What has been the biggest challenge faced by TPJ as an operator in Jakarta water 
service? 
7. What has been the biggest challenge for PAM Jaya in monitoring TPJ 
performance? 
8. In your opinion, if the Government had not involved the private sector, would PAM 
Jaya able to improve its service? 
9. Why does TPJ decided to sell 100 percent of its share to another investors (i.e. 
Aquatico and Alberta)?   
10. How did the process go? 
Questionnaire for Thames PAM Jaya 
1. What is Thames Water International role in the Jakarta water privatization? 
2. How does Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) monitor its performance? 
3. What has been the biggest challenge faced by TPJ as an operator in Jakarta water 
service? 
4. What initiatives have been taken by TPJ to overcome the problem on water 
shortage? 
5. What are the goals determined in the second rebasing (5 year target and 
evaluation)? 
6. Why does TPJ decided to sell 100 percent of its share to another investors (i.e. 
Aquatico and Alberta)?  How did the process go? 
Questionnaire for NGOs (WALHI, FORKAMI and KruHA) 
1. What is the role of your organisation in Jakarta water public private partnership? 
2. What do you think of Thames PAM Jaya Performance? 
3. Is Jakarta water supply public private partnership pro-poor based? 
4. Who is responsible in monitoring the private operators to fulfill their obligations? 
5. What do you think the constraints faced by the operators? 
6. Do you think public private partnership in water supply can push Indonesia to 
achieve the water supply target in MDGs? 
Questionnaire for the World Bank 
1. What is the role of the World Bank in the privatisation of Jakarta’s water supply? 
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2. How is the performance of private sector is being evaluated and by who? 
3. What are the consequences if operators cannot fulfil their obligations? 
4. What do you think are behind any improvements achieved in the provision of the 
water service?  (Availability of money as a loan or the involvement of the private 
sector for example)  
5. Would the public sector be able to carry out the same advancement if it received a 
loan from donor agencies, banks, etc? 
6. Have there been any improvements or success in the water service in Jakarta? 
Questionnaire for the Consumers 
Section 1:  General Information 
Information Response 
Name  
Place of Living (District)  
Sex Male Female 
Occupation  
< 0.5 2 - 4 
0.5 - 1 4 - 5 
Income or salary/month/household (in million Rupiah) 
1 - 2 > 5 
Number of persons/household  
Group I Group IIIB 
Group II Group IVA 
Tariff Group 
Group IIIA Group IVB 
Section 2:  Questions 
Questions Response 
 Private  I don’t know 1. Did you think that water supply provision is 
DKI Jakarta is run by… 
 Public   
2.  How much you pay for water per month? Rp. 
Did the water price rise the last 5 years?  Yes  No 3.  
Is it acceptable?  Yes  No 
 < 4 hours  13-16 hours 
 5-8 hours  17-20 hours 
4.  How long is the water run everyday? 
 9-12 hours  21-24 hours 
5. Do you have any problem with the water 
quality? 
 Yes  No 
Do you use any other source of drinking 
water? 
 Yes  No 
 Water vendor  Ground water 
6.  
If yes, what sources? 
 Bottled water  Pump 
Did you perceive any improvement in the 
water service provision since the last 5 
year? 
 Yes  No 
 Water quality 
 Water quantity 
 Connection service 
 Complaint response 
7. 
If yes, what kind of service? 
 Daily supply hours 
8. Are you satisfied with the water service 
provision? 
 Yes  No 
9. Do you have any other comments on the 
privatisation of Jakarta’s water service? 
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